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IMPOVERISHED ALGORITHMS:
MISGUIDED GOVERNMENTS, FLAWED
TECHNOLOGIES, AND SOCIAL CONTROL
Sarah Valentine *
ABSTRACT

This Article posits that governments deploy algorithms as social
control mechanisms to contain and criminalize marginalized
populations. Though recognition of the dangers inherent in misuse of
big data and predictive analytics is growing, governments and scholars
alike have not paid sufficient attention to how these systems
inevitably target the poor, the disabled, and communities of color. As
the criminal justice and social welfare systems have become fused, big
data analytics increases the breadth of government control over those
caught within these overlapping systems. Challenging governmental
use of algorithms as instruments of social control requires
understanding the fallibility of the technology, the historical and
political forces driving adoption of the technology, and the strategies
that have been most effective in advocating against it. It also requires
recognizing that the technological capacity to control and punish
includes, but also expands far beyond, uses by law enforcement.
This Article discusses the most problematic aspects of
governmental use of big data and artificial intelligence. These include
issues of governmental malfeasance, system capacity for masking
encoded bias, technological alteration of policy, the ceding of political
decisions to private developers, and systemic data error. It then
examines the social and political forces driving governmental
deployment of data analytics. It concludes by examining litigation,
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regulatory, and organizing strategies that can be used to challenge
governmental employment of algorithmic social control mechanisms.
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INTRODUCTION
Governments at all levels, from the local to the federal, are
increasing their reliance on algorithmic decision-making
technologies. 1 Helpful as algorithms may be, they inevitably target
marginalized populations and exacerbate the social stratification and
vast inequality that already exists in our society. Simply put,
algorithms are mathematical processes for solving defined problems. 2
Algorithmic decision-making technologies encompass a wide variety

1. Algorithmic decision-making is the use of algorithms to either assist human
decision-making or, now more commonly, to make decisions without human
intervention. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1249, 1252 (2008).
2. While “algorithm” is a term with a highly technical definition, scholars have
generalized the definition as a computational procedure for solving a specifically
defined task or problem. See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U.
PA. L. REV. 633, 640 n.14 (2017) (detailing observations by a host of well-known
scholars in the field of technology and the law, including Joanna Huey, Solon
Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg, David G. Robinson, and Harlan
Yu).
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of big-data analytic systems, 3 including predictive analytics 4 and
machine learning. 5 As these technologies grow more and more
sophisticated, human decision-making in the areas of criminal justice,
public benefits, and child welfare is rapidly being replaced by
technologies that few understand and many in positions of power
mistakenly believe are infallible. 6 When deployed to control and
contain vulnerable populations, these systems dehumanize the people
they target and impoverish standards of due process and justice.
Public awareness of the potential dangers that arise from misuse of
big data is increasing, 7 and legal academia has begun to grapple with
how this technology upends civil rights and privacy. 8 However,
current discussions tend to elide how these algorithmic technologies

3. Big data analytics is the increased computational analysis possible from the
application of advanced algorithms to increasingly large data sets. See David Lehr &
Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About
Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 669 (2017).
4. Predictive analytics is the use of complex algorithms to predict future
behavior through analyzing large data sets. See I. Glenn Cohen & Harry S. Graver,

Cops, Docs, and Code: A Dialogue Between Big Data in Health Care and Predictive
Policing, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 437, 438 (2017).

5. Machine learning algorithms are not programmed to complete a specifically
defined task, but rather to learn to solve more indeterminate problems — to develop
additional algorithms without additional programming. See Andrew Tutt, An FDA
for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 85 (2017); see also Robert D. Helfand, Big
Data and Insurance: What Lawyers Need to Know and Understand, 21 J. INTERNET
L. 1, 6 (2017) (explaining that machine learning programs revise their instructions
based on correlations that human programmers may not have considered).
6. See generally ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA
POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017)
[hereinafter THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING] (discussing predictive policing
technology in the criminal justice system); VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING
INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR
(2017) (detailing technologically enhanced governmental control over the poor in
social and family services).
7. See generally CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION, HOW BIG
DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016). Even with
increased attention, much of the public remains unaware of the capacity for
surveillance and manipulation big data analytics provides. See SAFIYA UMOJA
NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM
51–54 (2018).
8. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact,
104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016) (discussing Title VII’s inability to address
discrimination arising from employer’s data mining enhanced decision making);
Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the
Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871 (2016) (arguing that machine learning to
predict individual criminality may shift reasonable suspicion determinations to
predictive algorithms); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process:
Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93 (2014)
(arguing existing privacy protections are inadequate to address big data’s harms).
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increasingly become tools of social control, used to maintain rigid and
historical demarcations of class and race. For example, while police
officers have long had the ability to use their own judgment to decide
if there is the articulable suspicion necessary to stop and frisk
someone, 9 today that articulable suspicion may be guided by an
algorithm that neither the police officer nor anyone else in the police
Similarly, while
department understands or can explain. 10
caseworkers have always had to make decisions about whether or not
a family qualifies for public benefits or whether there is sufficient risk
of harm to remove a child, 11 now those decisions are guided and
sometimes determined by opaque and inexplicable predictive
analytics. 12
Although individual decisions made by police officers or
caseworkers can be biased or wrong, those decisions are traceable to
an individual actor in particular circumstances. Individual decisions
can be disputed in court, with those affected able to challenge the
circumstances or evidence the police officer or caseworker relied on.
Big data analytics is altering how these kinds of governmental
decisions are made and this, in turn, weakens the ability for those
harmed to effectively challenge those decisions. Big data systems are
often touted as more cost efficient and objective methods of
governmental decision-making concerning vulnerable populations.13
However, this focus on efficiency only glorifies savings over proper
services, and the belief that hyper-surveillance and predictive
analytics can solve deep issues of bias and discrimination is misguided
at best.
We live in a country that consigns a large part of its population to
an underclass, a permanently marginalized group contained,
controlled, and criminalized purportedly for the protection of
everyone else. 14 Over the past several decades, government has
9. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
10. See infra Section I.B.
11. See, e.g., Lauren Huber Martin, Comment, Caseworker Liability for the
Negligent Handling of Child Abuse Reports, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 191, 195–96 (1991)
(describing typical responsibility of child protection case worker investigating an
allegation of neglect or abuse).
12. See infra Section I.B.
13. Citron, supra note 1, at 1252–53 (discussing how the automation of benefits
decision-making systems are seen as more efficient and consistent); EUBANKS, supra
note 6, at 33 (discussing how the computerization of benefits systems as neutral tools
can reduce public spending).
14. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the
Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 467–68
(1992).
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coercively leveraged the welfare, foster care, prison, and deportation
systems to control residents of neighborhoods devastated by the
systemic withdrawal of public resources. 15 When these vulnerable
populations seek assistance, the state they encounter not only often
fails to support them, but it also actively targets them with punitive
social control mechanisms. 16 The criminal justice and social welfare
systems are now fused to better control and contain marginalized
populations such as the poor, the disabled, and communities of
color. 17
What happens when government introduces algorithmic decisionmaking systems into an already repressive environment? It increases
its capacity to dominate vulnerable communities by making it almost
impossible to challenge system errors. 18 It reinforces historical
discrimination by relying on inaccurate and biased data. 19 It further
destroys our country’s already meager social safety net by ceding
more regulatory power to private companies whose focus is profit.20
Most dangerously, it allows governments to hide these negative
effects behind the veneer of technological infallibility.
Technology is not neutral, and governmental reliance on big data
analytics has the capacity to further erode fundamental relationships
Unchecked
between the governing and the governed. 21
governmental use of algorithms as social control mechanisms 22 is
15. Dorothy Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black
Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1477–78 (2012). The criminalization of poverty

extends further into communities as the collateral consequences of mass
incarceration effect entire neighborhoods. See Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens:
Felony Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN ST. L. REV.
349, 366 (2012) (noting that disenfranchisement affects communities through vote
dilution and economic displacement from the redistribution of federal resources).
16. Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty, and
Support, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 318–19 (2014).
17. Id. at 334–36 (describing the state’s targeting of poor, urban, communities of
color as intentional).
18. See infra Sections I.B. and II.A.
19. See infra Section I.C.
20. See infra Section II.C.
21. Torin Monahan, Questioning Surveillance and Security, in SURVEILLANCE
AND SECURITY: TECHNOLOGICAL POLITICS AND POWER IN EVERYDAY LIFE 10 (2006)
(“Technologies are neither separate from society nor are they neutral
tools . . . [i]nstead [they] are part of the social problems they are intended to
correct.”); see also Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1934, 1953–54 (2013) (discussing how state surveillance affects the power
dynamic between “the watcher and the watched”).
22. Advanced algorithms and AI systems can, of course, be greatly beneficial. It
is governmental deployment of these technologies as social control mechanisms this
Article critiques. Technologically similar systems can be used for vastly different
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dangerous to many of our core democratic beliefs about due process
and equality, especially when the technology is used to target already
marginalized populations. Governmental adoption of these
technologies is inherently political, not only because it impacts the use
of governmental resources, but also because it reinforces some of the
worst aspects of our current justice system. Big data analytics
provides the state a degree of control over marginalized populations
that is unrivaled in American history. 23 To confront the increasingly
authoritarian application of big data analytics, progressive lawyers,
policymakers, and advocates must not only understand the
technology and how it reinforces oppression, but also must engage
with the socioeconomic forces that drive governments to adopt
technological systems of social control.
The layering of algorithms on top of the already complex social
structures underpinning our problematic justice system may seem like
a significant shift in practice to those of us not steeped in technology.
However, no matter how complex the mathematics, these systems are
less revolutionary than they are the logical evolution of past strategies
that governments have used to control marginalized people. 24 Thus,
many of the tools used to challenge governmental overreach in the
past provide the foundations with which to oppose big data analytics
— algorithms of social control themselves, both impoverished and
impoverishing.
This Article discusses various aspects of how and why governments
use algorithmic decision-making systems as a mechanism of social
control. It also explores potential avenues of resistance before
government reliance on these systems becomes unassailable. Part I
addresses issues of governmental malfeasance in implementing big
data technologies and discusses how the systemic flaws in the
deployment of seemingly “objective” tools can do harm to vulnerable
populations. Part II discusses some of the prominent sociopolitical
factors driving governmental adoption of big data technologies.

purposes. See, e.g., Allison J. Pugh, Automated Health Care Offers Freedom from
Shame, but Is It What Patients Need?, NEW YORKER (May 22, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/automated-health-care-offers-freedomfrom-shame-but-is-it-what-patients-need/amp
[https://perma.cc/RM6A-PW7K]
(describing similar systems where individuals interact with artificial intelligence, one
developed to provide low income patients assistance returning home from the
hospital and another developed to assist Homeland Security in interrogations).
23. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 200.
24. Id. at 37 (describing data analytics targeting the poor and working class as an
“expansion and continuation of moralistic and punitive poverty management
strategies existing since the 1820’s”).
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Finally, Part III considers how litigation, regulation, and political
activism can be combined to address the harms caused by
governmental deployment of these systems.
I. NEW TOOLS BUILT ON PAST PREJUDICE
Governments have always relied on the surveillance technology of
the day. 25 Historically, the burdens of surveillance have fallen
hardest on poor and marginalized populations. 26 Still, the wholesale
adoption of big data analytics is unique, 27 even as it shares troubling
historical roots with government use of other technologies.
Unprecedented levels of public and private surveillance 28 have
created what is commonly called “big data,” 29 an almost
unfathomable amount of searchable and sharable data on every
individual and community in the country.
The sheer amount of collected data from hyper-surveillance is
stunning, but it is the analytics that weaponizes this information,
allowing governments to “profile, police, and punish the poor.”30

25. See generally JEREMY BLACK, THE POWER OF KNOWLEDGE: HOW
INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY MADE THE MODERN WORLD (2014) (reviewing
historical governmental use of information and technology from the fall of the
Mongolian empire through the rise of big data).
26. Kimani Paul-Emile, Blackness as Disability?, 106 GEO. L.J. 293, 340–42 (2018)
(describing police profiling and systematic surveillance as social control mechanisms
that disproportionately target black populations); see also Nathalie Maréchal, First

They Came for the Poor: Surveillance of Welfare Recipients as an Uncontested
Practice, 33 MEDIA & COMM. 56 (2015) (describing persistent governmental

surveillance of poor and low-income Americans).
27. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (describing the
amount of searchable data available to law enforcement, in this case cell-site records,
as caused by “seismic shifts in digital technology”).
28. Data collection is a form of surveillance, and the current scope of this
surveillance is unprecedented. See Richards, supra note 21, at 1936. The level of
surveillance today is so immense that it necessitates a parsing of the concept. See
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Smart Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV.
547, 551, 551 n.15 (2017) (describing “sensorveillance” as the “ever increasing ability
for surveillance technologies to track individuals through the data trails they leave
behind,” and indicating the term was inspired by the concept of “dataveillance” used
to “describe the systematic observation, collation, and dissemination that modern
computing make possible”).
29. There is no uniform definition of “big data,” though in general it is recognized
as the aggregation of massive amounts of information in digital format to increase
analytic capacity to search and sort. See, e.g., Mary Madden et al., Privacy, Poverty,
and Big Data: A Matrix of Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U. L. REV.
53, 64 (2017) (describing big data as “the collection, aggregation, analysis, and use of
mass amounts of digital information gathered and shared about individuals”).
30. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 38. “Policing” is used to capture all the ways the
government forcefully attempts to regulate and manage the poor, regardless of
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Advances in computational science have created the ability to
capture, collect, and combine everyone’s digital trails and analyze
them in ever-finer detail. 31 It is this merging of big data with
advanced analytics that facilitates social control through algorithmic
decision-making systems. As political scientist, data scholar, and
activist Virginia Eubanks explains:
Forty years ago, nearly all of the major decisions that shape our lives
— whether or not we are offered employment, a mortgage,
insurance, credit, or a government service — were made by human
beings. They often used an actuarial process that made them think
more like computers than people, but human discretion still ruled
the day. Today, we have ceded much of that decision-making power
to sophisticated machines. Automated eligibility systems, ranking
algorithms, and predictive risk models control which neighborhoods
get policed, which families attain needed resources, who is shortlisted for employment, and who is investigated for fraud. 32

But algorithmic decision-making, built on imperfect science and
implemented using terribly flawed data sets, is generally hidden,
opaque, and unknowable — thus often unchallengeable, making it a
stealth weapon of social control governments find hard to resist.33
Limiting the harmful effects of big data analytics requires advocates
to recognize the political implications of these systems. It also
requires an understanding of just how much can, and does, go wrong
with algorithmic decision-making technology. From government
malfeasance in adopting and implementing the technology, to the
problematic analytics and inaccurate data inherent in their design, the
flaws are serious, systemic, and most often ignored.
A. Government Malfeasance
This section explores the ways in which government administrators
purchase and implement big data systems — often without
understanding how the technology impacts policy, without providing
regulatory oversight, and without accurately informing the public
about whether or how the systems are functioning. Problems arise
from the fact that merely implementing algorithmic decision-making
is dangerous, regardless of the technology used. Translating complex

whether it is done explicitly by law enforcement or through threats to remove access
to food, shelter, or one’s children. See id. at 215.
31. See THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 109–12 (describing
data collection and data mining techniques).
32. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 3.
33. See infra notes 62–70 and accompanying text.
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policy into computer code alters the policy itself, 34 often harming the
communities governed by the policy or regulations. 35 Additionally,
automating complex regulatory systems by operation delegates
legislative power to that system and its programmers. 36 As one
commentator explained, “[t]ranslating powerful, complex ideas into
the language of algorithms and machine learning protocols is the
mother of all statutory drafting and interpretation problems.” 37
Even in fairly simple systems, coding errors can have disastrous
effects. For example, New York City’s automated benefits system
was developed to guide caseworkers in determining eligibility for
various benefits. 38 The system failed to list an option for the
immigration status for “battered qualified alien,” thereby denying
benefits to an entire class of immigrant women fleeing domestic
violence. 39 The errors embedded in the New York City system are
not unusual, and similarly harmful errors continue to surface across
the country as more states adopt algorithmic decision-making
technologies. 40
Most government administrators implementing big data systems do
not have the capacity to understand them and cannot explain them.
The systems remain opaque, a “mysterious ‘black box’ impervious to

34. Citron, supra note 1, at 1261.
35. Id. at 1268–71 (describing how coding failures altered regulations in the
Colorado, California, and Texas public benefits systems, negatively affecting
thousands of recipients).
36. Id. at 1295 (noting that because the defects that occur during coding of policy
or rules are hidden, agencies fail to provide procedural safeguards typically applied in
rulemaking).
37. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, A Simpler World? On Pruning Risks and
Harvesting Fruits in an Orchard of Whispering Algorithms, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
27, 36 (2017).
38. M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 445 F. Supp. 2d 400, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
39. Id. at 413. New York’s automated benefits system also failed to include a
complete listing of the documents that could support an applicant’s eligibility, and
demanded documentation that was not required by law. Id.
40. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 1, at 1268 (“[F]rom September 2004 to April 2007,
code writers embedded over nine hundred incorrect rules into Colorado’s public
benefits system.
With one such incorrect rule, CBMS [Colorado Benefits
Management System] denied Medicaid to patients with breast and cervical cancer
based on income and asset limits that were not authorized by federal or state law.”).
In 2016, Arkansas implemented an algorithmic assessment program for disabled
Medicaid patients that included coding errors, mistakenly reducing benefits for
recipients with diabetes and cerebral palsy. See Colin Lecher, What Happens When
An Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care, VERGE (Mar. 21, 2018, 9:00 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/healthcare-medicaid-algorithmarkansas-cerebral-palsy [https://perma.cc/55ZZ-RWFP].
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challenge.” 41 In 2011, the Houston Independent School System
began using a privately developed algorithmic decision-making
system to terminate teachers. 42 During litigation, the school district
could not explain the algorithm’s outputs and refused to provide
information about the algorithm itself, arguing that it did not have
“custody, control or possession” of the technology. 43 The school
district also admitted that it ceded all teacher evaluations to the
algorithm’s developer and did not verify or audit the scores the
algorithm provided. 44
This ceding of authority to the developers is common, 45 and the
results are often spectacularly awful for those governed by the system.
For example, the Michigan Unemployment Insurance Agency used
outside contractors to develop the Michigan Integrated Data
Automated System (MiDAS). 46 A completely automated system,
MiDAS
made
determinations
of
unemployment
fraud
algorithmically, with absolutely no human review. 47 It also had a
ninety-three percent error rate. 48 MiDAS was so problematic that a
federal trial court granted a non-profit legal service provider standing

41. Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp.
3d 1168, 1179 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
42. Id. at 1171.
43. Id. at 1177 n.28.
44. Id. at 1177.
45. Id.; see also M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 445 F. Supp. 2d 400, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(discussing how an inaccurate code denied benefits to immigrants seeking assistance
in domestic violence cases); Citron, supra note 1, at 1309 (describing coding errors
that denied benefits to cancer patients); infra note 152 and accompanying text
(describing a code that automatically terminated benefits for failure to provide
certain documentation, regardless of fault).
46. Ryan Felton, Criminalizing the Unemployed, DETROIT METRO TIMES (July 1,
2015),
https://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/criminalizing-theunemployed/Content?oid=2353533 [https://perma.cc/E6YH-8Q44].
47. Robert M. Charette, Michigan’s MiDAS Unemployment System: Algorithm
Alchemy Created Lead, Not Gold, IEEE SPECTRUM (Jan. 24, 2018, 5:00 PM),
https://spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/computing/software/michigans-midasunemployment-system-algorithm-alchemy-that-created-lead-not-gold
[https://perma.cc/9VX7-TLW9]; see also Zynda v. Arwood, 2016 WL 4593828, at *1–2
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 2, 2016) (denying Michigan’s Motion to Dismiss, which argued that
the case should be thrown out on the grounds that it implemented human review and
ceased use of the MiDAS system). Training materials provided by Michigan
reportedly stated: “Regardless of the manner in which the information is gathered,
maintained, or processed, all UI functions are ultimately performed by MiDAS.” Ted
Roleofs, Broken: The Human Toll of Michigan’s Unemployment Fraud Saga,
BRIDGE (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.bridgemi.com/public-sector/broken-human-tollmichigans-unemployment-fraud-saga [https://perma.cc/69JW-KAHE].
48. Roleofs, supra note 47.
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to challenge the State’s deployment of the algorithmic tool. 49 The
court found that MiDAS’s error rate was so high that it forced the law
office to divert significant resources to handling the claims, which
amounted to injury sufficient to grant standing. 50
Shifting the power to determine policy to computer programmers is
inherently problematic from the perspective of democratic
governance. But it is also important to recognize to whom this power
is shifted. Tech fields have historically excluded women, black, and
Latinx individuals. 51 This exclusion practically insures that the
developers building the algorithms governments will use to control
marginalized communities will not include individuals from those
communities. 52 In other words, the people making programming
choices that alter government policy work from a perspective that
lacks the cultural awareness of those the technology most directly
affects. Beyond this collective problem of nonrepresentation, it is
also unfortunately likely that individual programmers will eschew any
responsibility for how the technology is ultimately used. 53
Governments also fail to test the systems they purchase prior to
This lack of due diligence is especially
implementation. 54
troublesome as more information about system bias and fallibility

49. Zynda v. Arwood, 175 F. Supp. 3d 791, 804 (E.D. Mich. 2016).
50. Id. at 805–06 (grant of standing to nonprofit law firm because number and
opaqueness of the fraud claims generated by MiDAS system).
51. NOBLE, supra note 7, at 64–65.
52. Id.
53. AARON RIEKE ET AL., UPTURN, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND., DATA BROKERS IN AN
OPEN
SOCIETY
43
(2016),
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/data-brokers-in-an-opensociety-20161121.pdf [https://perma.cc/JAU4-56UR] (“An occupational hazard of
becoming a technology expert is that one risks losing touch with the animating
concerns of social justice.”). This is not an overblown concern, as illustrated by this
particular incident: a programmer working on technology to retroactively determine
whether someone was a gang member was asked about the potential for someone
being mistakenly identified as a gang member because of biased training data. See
Matthew Hutson, Artificial Intelligence Could Identify Gang Crimes — and Ignite an
SCI.
MAG.
(Feb.
28,
2018,
8:00
AM),
Ethical
Firestorm,
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/02/artificial-intelligence-could-identify-gangcrimes-and-ignite-ethical-firestorm
[https://perma.cc/7YTZ-DQP6].
The
programmer denied any responsibility, claiming he could not be sure how the system
would be used and that he was “just an engineer.” Id. In another instance, a
developer of the algorithm used in Arkansas to assign Medicaid benefits argued that
the lack of transparency in the system was not problematic, because “at some point,
you’re going to have to trust me that a bunch of smart people determined this is the
smart way to do it.” Lecher, supra note 40.
54. Citron, supra note 1, at 1272.
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becomes available. 55 To make matters worse, government agencies
often refuse to concede when predictive technologies are failing,56
sometimes going so far as to threaten government employees who
In addition to these
raise concerns about the technology. 57
technology-specific issues, there are the more mundane ethical lapses
common to public-private contracting. Predictive algorithms are
expensive and the stakes for individual companies are high. 58 This
leads to public procurement with little or no competitive bidding, 59
and unsavory, if not illegal, relationships between government
officials and the companies from who they purchase. 60

55. See infra Sections II.B. and II.C. Not only is there more information about
issues with the technology, there are also suggested solutions that states seem
determined to overlook. See, e.g., Danielle Ensign et al., Runaway Feedback Loops
in Predictive Policing, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1, 10 (2018),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.09847.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQD8-JWQF] (showing ease of
modifying PredPol predictive policing system to minimize its asymmetrical feedback
loop that continues to send police into areas based on the technology, not the actual
crime rate); Elaine Angelino et al., Learning Certifiable Optimal Rule Lists for
19
J.
MACHINE
LEARNING
RES.
1,
Categorical
Data,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1704.01701.pdf [https://perma.cc/8F5P-X88J] (developing a
transparent algorithmic decision-making system for recidivism prediction that work
as well as the COMPAS non-transparent and proprietary system).
56. See M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 445 F. Supp. 2d 400, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting
that despite high-level awareness of the problems with the system “no meaningful
corrective action was taken”); see also Citron, supra note 1, at 1269 n.133 (discussing
how despite knowledge of system errors that incorrectly applied income limits to
women with breast or cervical cancer, administrators delayed fixing the system “for
years”).
57. Paul Eagon, Judges Feel Pressured After Blasting Michigan Jobless Agency,
FREE
PRESS
(July
2,
2017,
7:14
PM),
DETROIT
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2017/07/02/judges-michigan-joblessagency/423502001/ [https://perma.cc/7ERT-GUXH] (reporting pressure placed on
administrative law judges who were critical of the MiDAS system).
58. See Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology
Companies on Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 114–16 (2017) (describing Taser’s
attempt to monopolize the police body camera market).
59. See, e.g., David Gelles, Taser International Dominates the Police Body
Camera
Market,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
12,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/business/taser-international-dominates-thepolice-body-camera-market.html
[https://perma.cc/CDR5-PQSJ]
(describing
investigations into cities entering into no bid contracts with Taser).
60. Id. (noting the pattern of police chiefs being hired by Taser as consultants).
The Director of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services resigned
amid ethical concerns which included no bid contract for a company selling a
predictive analytics system. See Nancy Smith, Illinois Dumps George Sheldon’s
‘Failed’ Predictive Analytics Program, SUNSHINE STATE NEWS (Dec. 7, 2017, 6:00
AM),
http://sunshinestatenews.com/story/illinois-dumps-george-sheldons-eckerdkids-failed-predictive-analytics-program [https://perma.cc/5XPD-RV3W].
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Governments could address at least some of the concerns described
above by increasing transparency and providing ample opportunities
for public input prior to purchasing big data systems.61
Unfortunately, most governments are less than forthcoming about
adopting these technologies. Some jurisdictions go as far as deploying
predictive algorithms in secret, especially in the policing arena. In
Baltimore, the police department used data from a program that
provided aerial surveillance footage for months, without ever
reporting it to the mayor, the city council, prosecutors, or defense
attorneys — all because the program was privately funded. 62 Keeping
the program secret, especially from defense attorneys, is particularly
problematic because the Baltimore police used this aerial surveillance
information in criminal investigations. 63
Government reliance on funding loopholes to evade oversight is
not uncommon. In New Orleans, predictive policing technology was
kept secret because the company provided it for free. 64 In Seattle,
police used alternative funding to install surveillance cameras after
the city council refused to provide funding. 65 Similarly, police in
Bellingham, Washington, purchased a predictive policing system in
the face of community and city council opposition, and while the

61. See infra note 317 and accompanying text (discussing use of procurement
ordinances as a method to increase government transparency with regards to the
purchase of surveillance technology).
62. Kevin Rector & Luke Broadwater, Report of Secret Aerial Surveillance by
Baltimore Police Prompts Questions, Outrage, BALT. SUN (Aug. 24, 2016, 10:22 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-secretsurveillance-20160824-story.html [https://perma.cc/9KKF-VHHY] (describing how
the program was kept secret); Kevin Rector, Aerial Surveillance by Baltimore Police
Has Promise, Should Be Studied More, Report Concludes, BALT. SUN (Feb. 10, 2017,
10:11 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-cisurveillance-report-20170210-story.html [https://perma.cc/L8TM-NMMZ] (listing
officials who did not know about the system).
63. See Rector, Aerial Surveillance by Baltimore Police Has Promise, supra note
62.
64. Matt Sledge & Ramon Antonio Vargas, Controversial Policing Software
Draws Criticism in New Orleans, GOV’T TECH. (Mar. 2, 2018),
http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/Controversial-Policing-Software-DrawsCriticism-in-New-Orleans.html [https://perma.cc/52UG-Z7RW].
The policing
program, which would have generally needed city council approval, was listed in the
budget as a “philanthropic venture” allowing it to “[fly] under the radar” for years.
Nicole Lindsey, Predictive Policing Raises Important Privacy and Human Rights
CPO
MAG.
(Mar.
16,
2018),
Concerns,
https://www.cpomagazine.com/2018/03/16/predictive-policing-raises-importantprivacy-and-human-rights-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/BJ9Q-9UZT].
65. Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 91 WASH. L.
REV. 1595, 1606 (2016).
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public was notified, the hearing where public comment was solicited
was held after the decision to purchase the system was already
finalized. 66
Police and prosecutors have also actively misled courts and defense
counsel through “parallel construction” tactics to obscure the actual
data relied on in their investigations. 67 Authorities routinely cite
contractual nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) 68 and developer
claims of trade secrets to avoid releasing all relevant information
about predictive policing systems. 69 All of these tactics threaten
constitutional freedoms and increase state capacity to successfully
target and control populations.
This is doubly problematic

66. DAVID ROBINSON & LOGAN KOEPKE, STUCK IN A PATTERN: EARLY EVIDENCE
“PREDICTIVE
POLICING”
AND
CIVIL
RIGHTS
10
(2016),
https://www.teamupturn.org/static/reports/2016/stuck-in-a-pattern/files/Upturn__Stuck_In_a_Pattern_v.1.01.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VQU-42DR].
67. See Claire Powers, Surveillance Remedies: Stingrays and the Exclusionary
Rule, 96 OR. L. REV. 337, 351–55 (2017) (discussing use of parallel construction,
nondisclosure agreements, euphemisms and other techniques to hide technologies
such as cell site simulators); Elizabeth N. Jones, Possible Problems at the San
Clemente Checkpoint, 6 VA. J. CRIM. L. 43, 83–86 (2018) (detailing investigations
into parallel construction in drug enforcement cases, including reports suggesting that
government officials are encouraged and trained to mislead courts and defense
counsel); see also United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2016) (Woods,
J., dissenting) (finding the government purposefully concealed the Stingray’s use
from a magistrate, the district court, defense counsel, and the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit). Prosecutors have also dismissed charges against defendants
rather than disclose particular surveillance technologies. See Alexandra Burlacu, FBI
Drops Child Pornography Case to Avoid Disclosing Tor Vulnerability, TECH TIMES
(Mar. 7, 2017, 10:42 AM), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/200592/20170307/fbidrops-child-pornography-case-to-avoid-disclosing-tor-vulnerability.htm
[https://perma.cc/NS4M-MLY8].
68. At least one court has held that police reliance on nondisclosure agreements
to intentionally withhold information from a court when seeking a warrant “obstructs
a court’s ability to make the necessary constitutional appraisal.” State v. Andrews,
134 A.3d 324, 338–39 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016). In 2017, a New York trial court
held that nondisclosure agreements, without more, could not insulate the New York
City Police Department from a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request
concerning information about predictive policing technologies. See Brennan Center
for Justice v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 2017 WL 6610414, at *10–12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec.
27, 2017).
69. See Joh, supra note 58, at 119. Some states are attempting to increase
transparency in algorithmic risk modeling systems. The Pennsylvania Sentencing
Commission sought public input and then rejected commercial products that refused
to allow defendants to review the algorithm. Joshua Brustein, This Guy Trains
Computers to Find Future Criminals, BLOOMBERG MEDIA (July 18, 2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-richard-berk-future-crime/
[https://perma.cc/K5F9-WJ2X].
ON
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considering that algorithmic tools target the populations least able to
challenge them. 70
Even in circumstances where government officials act with integrity
and are transparent about their intentions to deploy predictive
technology, significant issues remain. The analytics used are flawed
and the databases the algorithms run on are riddled with errors. 71
This is a devastating combination, which creates algorithmic decisionmaking systems that reinforce historical patterns of discrimination
and bias.
B. Problematic Analytics
The predictive algorithm systems that governments rely on do not
work as advertised and are far from infallible. In addition, the
systems conceal the political choices used to program the algorithms,
and the opaque nature of the code obfuscates the feedback loops that
reinforce their discriminatory application. Much of the harm caused
by big data analytics could be minimized if the agencies adopting
them did minimal due diligence prior to purchase. Given the overzealous marketing of big data analytics as a panacea to much of
society’s ills, it is important to pause and consider just how fallible
and dangerous these systems can be. 72
There is little research on whether predictive policing systems
actually work. Most of the studies on these systems are either
authored or paid for by the very companies developing them,73

70. See, e.g., Alvaro M. Bedoya, The Color of Surveillance: What an Infamous
Abuse of Power Teaches Us About the Modern Spy Era, SLATE (Jan. 18, 2016, 5:55

AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/01/what_the_fbi_s_surveil
lance_of_martin_luther_king_says_about_modern_spying.html
[https://perma.cc/2HXN-MELD] (noting that targets of state surveillance are
historically people of color and immigrants).
71. See infra Sections I.B. and I.C.
72. This Article addresses how various states within the United States utilize
algorithmic social control mechanisms. However, other countries have implemented
such technologies with similarly horrendous outcomes. One glaring example is the
Australian Centrelink debacle, which falsely accused thousands of defrauding the
government. See Justin Warren, Australian Government Fails at IT Again, FORBES
(Jan.
1,
2017,
10:05
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/justinwarren/2017/01/17/australian-government-fails-atit-again/#6e3e211f60d5 [https://perma.cc/5XQD-5VBZ].
73. ROBINSON & KOEPKE, supra note 66, at 7–8 (2016) (“We are currently aware
of two rigorous, scholarly studies of predictive policing in the United States whose
authors have no interest in the success of the method being evaluated. Both of these
were conducted by the RAND Corporation. Neither analysis found any safety
benefit in the predictive policing tools studied.”).
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leaving police departments with little reliable information to use
when deciding whether to procure predictive algorithms. 74 Early
successes in crime control have not always been sustained, and while
new jurisdictions continue to purchase predictive policing systems,
others have discontinued or cancelled contracts. 75
Similarly, independent research on one of the common algorithms
used to assess a defendant’s likelihood of reoffending found that the
algorithm correctly predicted violent recidivism only twenty percent
of the time. 76 When all crimes, including misdemeanors, were taken
into account, the algorithm was only “somewhat more accurate than a
coin flip.” 77 But the errors of this algorithm are far worse than being
merely incorrect — the mistakes it made were racially biased. The
algorithm wrongly labeled black defendants as future re-offenders at
almost twice the rate as white defendants, and white defendants were
mislabeled as low risk more often than black defendants. 78
Criminal justice algorithms are not the only error ridden ones.
Michigan’s implementation of its MiDAS unemployment algorithmic
decision-making system 79 was particularly destructive. Designed as a
fraud detection system, MiDAS reviewed not only current
unemployment applications but also any benefits received within the
past six years. 80 The ninety-two percent error rate of the “roboadjudicated” reviews upended countless lives, flooded the state
administrative appeals system with cases, 81 and ultimately cost the

74. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV.
1109, 1159 (2017).
75. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 70 (noting that data on
effectiveness of predictive policing remains inconclusive).
76. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminalsentencing [https://perma.cc/Z4N2-JB23].
77. Id. (“Of those deemed likely to re-offend, 61 percent were arrested for any
subsequent crimes within two years.”).
78. Id.
79. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
80. See Plaintiff’s First Amended Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand at
¶¶4-5, Cahoo et al. v. SAS Inst., No. 17-10657, 2017 WL 3405195 (E.D. Mich. July 7,
2017).
81. Ryan Felton, Inside Michigan’s Faulty Unemployment System that Hit
Thousands with Fraud, GUARDIAN (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/feb/12/michigan-unemployment-insurance-benefit-automated-systemfraud-penalties [https://perma.cc/5QD4-LCEW] (reporting that the system created a
backlog of 23,000 unemployment appeals cases).
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State of Michigan tens of millions of dollars in addition to the $47
million dollars it has already paid to create the system. 82
There are similar concerns with the predictive analytics used in
child welfare.
One of the developers who designed a child
maltreatment risk assessment tool for Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania, designed a similar system to be used in New Zealand.83
The risk assessment system was implemented in Allegheny County,84
but implementation in New Zealand was halted in part because
subsequent research showed it had a nearly seventy percent error rate
when identifying children at highest risk. 85 The Los Angeles County
Office of Child Protection halted the adoption of another child
welfare algorithm when auditing indicated a ninety-five percent falsepositive rate. 86 Illinois recently terminated its contract with a
company providing a child abuse prediction system because, in the
words of the director, “it didn’t seem to be predicting much.” 87
Lack of governmental understanding of the algorithmic tools they
purchase involves issues beyond purchasing error-prone systems. The
development of decision-making algorithms, from inception through
complex and layered computer coding, is a multistep affair requiring

82. See Paul Egan, Michigan Agency Review Finds 70% Error Rate in Jobless
Findings, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Aug. 11, 2017, 8:39 PM),
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2017/08/11/michigan-agencyreview-finds-70-error-rate-fraud-findings/559880001/ [https://perma.cc/AP4B-LZG5]
(discussing how the agency gives various error rates depending on whether the review
was completely automated (robo-adjudication) or included human review of the files
flagged by the algorithm).
83. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 136–38.
84. Id. at 137.
85. Id. at 138.
86. See JUDGE MICHAEL NASH, EXAMINATION OF USING STRUCTURED DECISION
MAKING® AND PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS IN ASSESSING SAFETY AND RISK IN CHILD
WELFARE
(May
4,
2017),
http://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/bc/1023048_05.04.17OCPReportonRiskAssessm
The
entTools_SDMandPredictiveAnalytics_.pdf [https://perma.cc/BL3K-7U7V].
Director of the Los Angeles County Office of Child Protection indicated that the
system had a 95.6% false-positive rate. Daniel Heimpel, Uncharted Waters: Data
Analytics and Child Protection in Los Angeles, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE (July 20,
2015), https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/featured/uncharted-waters-data-analyticsand-child-protection-in-los-angeles/10867 [https://perma.cc/YL3K-YS2L].
87. David Jackson & Gary Marx, Data Mining Program Designed to Predict
Child Abuse Proves Unreliable, DCFS Says, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 6, 2017),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/ct-dcfs-eckerd-met-20171206story.html [https://perma.cc/RZ59-SNN6] (quoting Illinois Department of Children
and Family Services Director Beverly “B.J.” Walker). Even with these predictive
failures, at least seven other states continue to use similar systems from this vendor.
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choices that create many opportunities for human error and bias.88
For example, when building an algorithmic system, a choice has to be
made as to how different errors, false positives and false negatives,
are weighed. This means that in developing a predictive policing
system, a decision will have to be made as to which is worse: to have
an innocent person treated as a potential criminal (a false positive) or
to have the algorithm overlook potential criminal activity (a false
negative). 89
False positives upend people’s lives in a manner that cannot be
disregarded or minimized. For those involved with the child welfare
system, for instance, false positives are not mere inconveniences. A
child welfare investigation can have profound and long-lasting
consequences on children and families, 90 including increased risk of
juvenile delinquency, 91 parental loss of employment, 92 and
deportation. 93 Simultaneously, a false negative means that potential

88. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 3, at 665–66 (describing the multiple steps in
algorithmic development and potential challenges); see also Rich, supra note 8, at
885–86 (describing points of human decision making in development of algorithms
that can cause inaccuracies and errors). It is likely that systems developed by humans
are inherently biased. See NOBLE, supra note 7, at 2 (suggesting that the racist and
sexist attitudes of those developing search algorithms undermine the idea that they
are capable of developing neutral or objective decision-making tools).
89. Rich, supra note 8, at 885.
90. See Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of Emergency
Removal in Child Protective Proceedings, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 457, 459 (2003)
(describing the harm to families and children from child removals and also noting the
danger children face in the foster care system); Doriane Lambelet Coleman,

Storming the Castle to Save the Children: The Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare
Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 413, 417–19 (2005)

(describing the damage child welfare investigations inflict on children).
91. Alicia LeVezu, Alone and Ignored: Children Without Advocacy in Child
Abuse and Neglect Courts, 14 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 125, 126 (2018)
(describing studies which found that children in the foster care system have higher
rates of juvenile delinquency and involvement with the criminal justice system).
92. See Humphries v. County of Los Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2009)
(noting that the consequences of parents being listed in California’s Central Index
include the inability to secure licenses for a variety of jobs); Amy Sindin, “Why
Won’t Mom Cooperate?”: A Critique of Informality in Child Welfare Proceedings,
11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 362–63 (1999) (describing the mental health
consequences created by family separation on children and parents); see also
EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 161 (describing the impact that a child welfare
investigation has on families).
93. See Nina Rabin, Disappearing Parents: Immigration Enforcement and the
Child Welfare System, 44 CONN. L. REV. 99, 102 (2011) (explaining that the
intersection of child welfare and immigration systems increases the likelihood of
family separation and deportation); David B. Thronson, Creating Crisis: Immigration
Raids and the Destabilization of Immigrant Families, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391,
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child maltreatment is missed. Because there is an “unavoidable
nexus” between the two types of errors, an algorithmic shift towards
one automatically creates an opposing shift away from the other. 94
Computer programmers must “tune” an algorithm to favor one
type of error over the other, or, if possible, must attempt to weigh
each of these algorithmic mistakes equally. Each such “tuning” is not
only a technological decision, but a political one, the outcome of
Unfortunately, these
which privileges different stakeholders. 95
political decisions are often made without the input of anyone other
than a private company or individual programmer. 96 Worse yet, these
choices, created through the process of selecting and assigning
weights to variables, 97 can be shifted to actively penalize already
targeted populations. One striking example of this is how older
benefits automation systems were coded so that the computers would
interpret all errors against the recipient rather than the agency. 98
Developing algorithmic decision-making systems to prioritize false
positives, especially in systems that involve state coercion and control,
is politically driven and often connected to economic concerns. A
probation algorithm implemented in Philadelphia was initially
intentionally coded to overpredict the likelihood that an inmate
would commit a violent crime if paroled. 99 When the city realized the
cost of serving the large number of inmates flagged by a system tuned
to prioritize false positives, it had the developer alter the weighting of

408–09 (2008) (discussing how states are using immigration status to decline family
reunification services).
94. Robert J. Lukens, The Impact of Mandatory Reporting Requirements on the
Child Welfare System, 5 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 213 (2007).
95. Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the
Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 120 (2018).
96. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing how individual code
writers alter governmental policy) and supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text
(describing governmental ceding of authority to third-party system developers).
97. See Virginia Eubanks, A Response to Allegheny County DHS, VIRGINIA
EUBANK BLOG (Feb. 16, 2018), https://virginia-eubanks.com/2018/02/16/a-responseto-allegheny-county-dhs/ [https://perma.cc/6MRJ-RXK4] (noting that to understand a
predictive analytic system, one needs to know the variables and the weight the system
assigns to each variable).
98. Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1357–58
(2012). An agency mindset that assumes fraud on the part of those it is supposed to
assist is also evident in Michigan’s MiDAS system. There, a court determined that
the system’s questionnaire automatically targeted applicants rather than being a
neutral request for an explanation about any discrepancies, which was “decidedly
accusatory” and violated a claimant’s Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. Zynda v. Arwood, 175 F. Supp. 3d 791, 809 (E.D. Mich. 2016).
99. Brustein, supra note 69.
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the system variables to reduce the number of inmates scored as “high
risk” for violent recidivism. 100
Politics, or at least the sociocultural reflections of politics, influence
big data analytics in other ways. Since society is reflected in the
information contained in data sets utilized by algorithms in making
predictions, even well-designed systems will replicate and amplify the
preexisting biases and discrimination inherent in society. 101 Current
legal doctrine is often of limited value in remedying these types of
harms, because the bias or discrimination created by algorithmic
decision-making, even if it tracks constitutionally prohibited
prejudice, is masked by outwardly neutral proxy variables coded into
the systems. 102 This creates a sort of algorithmic “rational” racism, 103
which can be as destructive as overt prejudice but is easier to miss and
harder to challenge. 104
That predictive algorithms mask preexisting patterns of
discrimination is perhaps most visible in policing. Given law
enforcement’s long history of racial discrimination, proxies for race
become “baked” 105 into predictive policing systems. For example, if
police primarily arrest people of color from minority neighborhoods
for marijuana-related offenses, even though people of all races and all
neighborhoods use marijuana at equal rates, the algorithm will

100. Id.
101. Predictive analytics rely on an iterative process: actions are taken based on
algorithmic information; these actions are then translated into further data that is fed
back into the system. When run on biased data this creates a feedback loop that
perpetuates bias. See KADIJA FERRYMAN & MIKAELA PITCAN, DATA & SOC’Y,
FAIRNESS IN PRECISION MEDICINE 11 (2018), https://datasociety.net/output/fairnessin-precision-medicine/ [https://perma.cc/YTR7-B38T].
102. A proxy variable is a characteristic that correlates with another attribute that
the algorithm’s developer wants to include. For example, variables such as
neighborhoods or zip codes are outwardly neutral proxies that allow an algorithm to
take race into account without referencing race directly. See Barocas & Selbst, supra
note 8, at 712.
103. EUBANKS supra note 7, at 190. See also Philip Hacker & Bilyana Petkova,

Reining in the Big Promise of Big Data: Transparency, Inequality, and New
Regulatory Frontiers, 15 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 7–9 (2017) (noting that big

data analytics can uncover correlations that are seemingly neutral but track
discriminatory traits).
104. See, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 712–13 (arguing that the intent
necessary under Title VII and similar civil rights laws can be masked through
manipulation of variables, which serve as proxies obscuring even intentional
discrimination).
105. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 122. Anywhere race and
poverty correlate, systems using variables that measure poverty as any part of their
predictive algorithm, such as foreclosures or concentration of multifamily dwellings,
will end up replicating systemic racism. Id.
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correlate both race and minority neighborhoods with marijuana
use. 106 When police departments develop strategies based on the
results of such an algorithm, the strategies will correlate race with
drugs even if race was completely removed from the model, because
of the location correlation. 107
But bias is not limited to predictive policing systems. When
Allegheny County was developing its Family Screening Tool (AFST),
it selected two outcome variables to be used as stand-ins for child
maltreatment. 108 The first variable was community re-referral, where
a call to the child maltreatment hotline was initially screened out, but
the county received another call to the hotline on the same child
within two years; 109 the second was child placement, where a call to
the hotline was initially screened in, and resulted in the child being
placed in foster care within two years. 110 The county admitted that
these two variables were not optimal, but argued that the “model has
One of the outcome variables,
to test what’s available.” 111
community re-referral, is based entirely on the most racially biased
part of Allegheny County’s child welfare system. 112 Thus the county
used the activity known to introduce the most racial bias into its child

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Outcome variables are used to measure the phenomenon a system is trying to
predict. In the Allegheny County screening tool, the outcome variables are “how”
child maltreatment was defined in the algorithm. Predictive variables are factors the
algorithm determines correlate with finding the outcome variables (child
maltreatment). When building the AFST, the developers initially began with close to
300 predictive variables, but ultimately ended up with 131 predictive variables they
found highly correlated with either re-referral or child placement. EUBANKS, supra
note 6, at 144.
109. Id. at 143.
110. Id. at 144.
111. Id. The number of significant individual instances of child maltreatment in
the county was not large enough to be able to develop a statistically significant
model, so the developers had to select other events or actions to include as outcome
variables. Id.
112. Community members call the hotline three and a half times more often on
black and biracial families than they do on white families. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at
153. In its own study, Allegheny County determined that the greatest racial
disproportionality in its child welfare system takes place at the point when a
community member calls to refer a child via the abuse and neglect hotline, not when
a screener determines whether or not to screen the child into the system. Id.; see also
Press Release, Marc Cherna, Dir., Dep’t of Human Servs., DHS Response to
(Jan.
31,
2018),
Automated
Inequality
by
Virginia
Eubanks
https://www.alleghenycounty.us/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=6
442461672 [https://perma.cc/S3CQ-SCTA] (acknowledging racial bias in call
referrals).
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welfare system as one of two events the model defined as child
maltreatment. 113
The AFST system also oversampled poverty as an indicator that a
child was at high risk of harm. This is because the majority of the
predictive variables 114 the algorithm analyzed tracked income-based
programs such as food stamps, TANF grants, 115 county medical
assistance and supplemental security income (SSI), or other indicators
of poverty such as homelessness, lack of food, or any family
involvement with the juvenile justice or probation systems. 116 Thus
by its selection of which outcome and predictive variables the system
would measure, Allegheny County created an algorithm that directly
links poverty and race to the likelihood of child maltreatment. 117
Once a family is scored as “at high risk” by the AFST, they come
under increased scrutiny and surveillance, creating a potential cycle of
bias. The information is permanently stored in the Allegheny County
Behavior that might have once been seen as
database. 118
inconsequential will forever be viewed through a lens that marks the
family as potential abusers. 119 If Allegheny County implements a

113. This was done even though there were other variables that could have
reduced algorithmic bias — the system could have used likelihood of being screened
into the system or only used the likelihood of removal, both of which are based on
the professional judgments of caseworkers and family court judges. EUBANKS, supra
note 6, at 155.
114. Id. at 143–44 (explaining the difference between predictive and outcome
variables). Once the AFST system is implemented, the algorithm searches the
information in the county database on those living with the child for any of the
predictive variables and, using a system that weights each variable, assigns the family
a score suggesting how more or less likely it is the child will be maltreated. Id.
115. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) is the federal program
that provides monies to states via block grants for aiding poor families. Andrew
Hammond, Welfare and Federalism’s Peril, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1721, 1722 (2017).
116. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 156.
117. Id. at 144.
118. Id. at 150.
119. In the past, a family that successfully extracted itself from the child welfare
system or a person found not guilty of a crime could fade into “practical obscurity,”
because the government did not have the capacity to capture and analyze the data
necessary to reveal past entanglements with government entities. See Fred Cate,
Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 435, 435 (2008) (noting that technology erodes the individual privacy once
provided by “practical obscurity”). Eubanks’ exploration of the AFST demonstrates
the persistent and discriminatory nature of algorithmic scoring. The reader is
introduced to a family with a child that was subject to a series of child welfare
investigations, all unfounded — meaning there was no indication of child
maltreatment — based on referral calls possibly made by an angry neighbor. Even
though all of those calls were unfounded, that call information goes into and remains
in the county data pool. Because the algorithm uses chance of re-referral as one of its
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predictive policing algorithm, this information could be forever
factored into that system as well. 120 A similar phenomenon occurs
when predictive policing systems target those who live in high crime
areas or have had repeated contacts with police, because those
variables correlate with crime. 121 This feedback loop, which has been
tellingly described as “selection bias meets confirmation bias,”122
consistently directs police back into the same neighborhoods, thereby
continuing to populate databases with data reinforcing the systems’
initial biased predictions.
Challenging algorithmic decision-making is made even more
difficult because the technology consists of multiple layers of complex
subsystems.
For example, during the litigation challenging
Arkansas’s implementation of its Medicaid algorithm, 123 it became
clear that there were at least two major subsystem errors causing
mistaken reductions in benefits. One was within the algorithm itself
and the other was in the software of another company responsible for
creating the platform that allowed the algorithm to interface with the
state’s database. 124 While this particular error was somewhat

proxy variables, this child is forever connected to a series of referral calls. Allegheny
County is apparently considering applying its system to every child born in the
county. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 171–72. If this child grows up and gives birth in
Allegheny County that data will follow her, increasing the likelihood that the
algorithm will flag her own newborn child as at risk for maltreatment, regardless of
her parenting capacity. See id.
120. See id. at 135 (describing the different county entities whose records are
stored in a central repository in which the child welfare algorithm is run. These
include adult and juvenile probation records, county jail records, and Allegheny
County police records.); see also THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at
14–18 (describing the interlinked and permanent digital record of information on
individuals based on information collected by local, state, and federal governments
which are often searchable by a myriad of government entities); EUBANKS, supra
note 6, at 93–94 (personal information about those seeking homeless services in Los
Angeles shared with the Los Angeles Police Department).
121. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 46–48.
122. Kristian Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, 13 SIGNIFICANCE 14, 16
(2016), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-9713.2016.00960.x [https://perma.cc/8HYA4Q8H].
123. See Lecher, supra note 40 (describing Arkansas’s adoption of algorithmic
assessment system for Medicaid patients).
124. Id.; Transcript of Trial at 38, 40, Jacobs ex rel. v. Gillespie, 3:16-cv-00119
(E.D. Ark. Oct. 27, 2016) [hereinafter Jacobs Trial Transcript] (on file with author).
Similarly, in a recently filed class action in the Michigan Unemployment Insurance
debacle, the complaint alleged that three different groups of private corporate actors
designed, created, implemented, or maintained the error-ridden automated MiDAS
system deployed by the state. Cahoo v. SAS Inst. Inc., 322 F. Supp. 3d 772, 787 (E.D.
Mich. 2018).
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complex, 125 even simple calculation errors can create a cascade of
algorithmic mistakes. 126 Additionally, coding errors remain hidden
unless there is a concerted challenge to the system or repeated annual
testing. 127
C. Inaccurate and Discriminatory Data
Big data analytics includes not just the computer algorithms
themselves, as straightforward or complex as they may be. Big data
analytics includes “big data.” Even carefully constructed and
transparent algorithms are only as good as the data they process. It is
through the data that algorithms detect patterns and make
predictions, and it is the data that determines how well algorithms
actually function. 128 Data sets, especially the massive data sets
needed to train predictive analytic systems, are another important
reason why the predictive analytics used by governments to target
and control vulnerable populations are dangerously flawed.
The immense data sets that big data analytics require are often
inaccurate and incomplete and are generally impervious to attempts
at correction. While governments have always surveilled people
within their borders, one key aspect of modern data collection is the
extent to which data is aggregated to create vast, searchable, evergrowing data sets. This “big data” comes in large part from private
data brokers 129 that collect, aggregate, and sell information gleaned
from an almost unimaginable range of sources. 130 Government

125. See Jacobs Trial Transcript, supra note 124, at 36–37 (documenting the
difficulty the State’s attorney and the judge had with understanding where the errors
occurred and how each might affect the case).
126. See Eric Westervelt, Did a Bail Reform Algorithm Contribute to this San
Francisco Man’s Murder?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 18, 2018, 2:00 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/08/18/543976003/did-a-bail-reform-algorithm-contribute-tothis-san-francisco-man-s-murder [https://perma.cc/G29J-LDY7] (reporting that
mistakes in calculating the number of days an inmate had spent in jail led to an
incorrect risk assessment score for the court to review when making pre-trial release
determination).
127. See K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d 703, 714 (D. Idaho 2016) (noting that
inaccuracy of algorithmic “budget tool” for Medicaid recipients “puts a premium on
testing the tool for accuracy”).
128. Lehr & Ohm, supra note 3, at 677.
129. Data brokers supply data or inferences about people gathered mainly from
sources other than the data subjects themselves. RIEKE ET AL., supra note 53, at 11.
130. See id. at 9–11 (observing that data is gathered from public sources such as
state licensing information, school data, social media, etc., as well as from private
sources such as information provided by healthcare systems, financial institutions,
employers, and retailers); THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 12–15
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agencies also compile their own massive data sets, built on arrest
records, convictions, alleged gang affiliations, probation and parole
records, child welfare reports, licensing applications, education
records and other sources. 131 Technological advances allow these
data sets to be searched across formats without requiring the data to
be centrally located or merged. 132
As governments routinely purchase data from data brokers, the
separation between public and private data is continuously eroded.133
This “collect it all” mindset,134 which endorses the gathering and
retention of as much data as possible, serves two functions. First, it
reifies data analytics as a tool of state control. 135 Second, it creates
the massive data sets necessary for predictive analytics.136
Additionally, governments’ propensity to collect, store, and search
ever-increasing amounts of information fosters a public-private
symbiotic relationship which reinforces the market for algorithmic
social control systems.
The problem is that all large data sets are “dirty,” filled with errors
and mistakes. 137 Neither private companies 138 nor governments
spend the time and money necessary to ensure their accuracy. 139 In

(describing the myriad ways in which individuals are tracked and surveilled, and the
data sold to data brokers).
131. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 17–19.
132. Max N. Helveston, Consumer Protection in the Age of Big Data, 93 WASH. U.
L. REV. 859, 867 (2016).
133. Governments can purchase directly from data brokers, or indirectly when they
use systems provided by private companies that themselves rely on data provided by
data brokers.
134. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 107.
135. Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice
Data, 101 MINN. L. REV. 541, 549 (2016).
136. See THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 13 (observing that the
combination of big data and new analytic tools supports development of predictive
policing algorithms).
137. See, e.g., Madden et al., supra note 29, at 87 (noting the “troublingly high”
error rate in consumer credit reports); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and
Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 398–99 (2015) (describing
the errors in police gang databases, arrest reports, and FBI files); Richard Warner &
Robert H. Sloan, The Ethics of the Algorithm: Autonomous Systems and the
Wrapper of Human Control, 48 CUMB. L. REV. 37, 44–45 (2018) (stating predictive
analytics require data to be simplified and decontextualized, removing ambiguity and
narrative essential to explaining human behavior).
138. See Madden et al., supra note 29, at 88 (describing the difficulty consumers
face when attempting to correct errors in credit reports).
139. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 689 (2016) (noting that decision-makers
justify using easily accessible but inaccurate data because of the higher cost of
creating accurate data sets).
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addition, data brokers do not merely sell factual data, incorrect or
not. They also sell model data — inferences about individuals based
on algorithmic predictions. 140 This creates an additional layer of less
than accurate information government algorithms analyze. Thus,
error rates in government systems are often exacerbated when
governments combine data from data brokers with already
problematic government data. 141 Large data sets are also vulnerable
to generating their own errors in the form of false or spurious
statistical relationships. This is because the risk of an algorithm
surfacing a statistically significant but contextually meaningless
connection between variables increases as the size of data sets
increases. 142
Data error leads to faulty predictions and potentially dangerous
In 2009, Justice Ginsburg warned that
wrong decisions. 143
“[i]naccuracies in expansive, interconnected collections of electronic
information raise grave concerns for individual liberty.” 144 That

140. RIEKE ET AL., supra note 53, at 11.
141. Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109,
136 (2017) (describing how data brokers assemble and organize their data on the
assumption that it will be used for advertising, a very risk-tolerant activity, which
means that brokers have no incentive to correct errors).
142. Rick Swedloff, Risk Classification’s Big Data (R)evolution, 21 CONN. INS. L.J.
339, 355 (2015); see also Nicholas Taleb, Beware the Dangers of Big Data, WIRED
MAG. (Feb. 8, 2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/02/big-data-means-big-errorspeople/ [https://perma.cc/LY3Q-HEMT] (“[I]n large data sets the large deviations
the algorithms surface are vastly more attributable to variance (or noise) than to
information (or signal)”). One example of this was the claim that algorithmic mining
of Google search results predicted the spread of the flu more accurately and quickly
than the Center for Disease Control and Prevention. This heralded prediction
capacity faltered and ultimately failed in part because the size of the data set surfaced
spurious correlations. See Gary Marcus & Ernest Davis, Eight (No, Nine!) Problems
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
6,
2014),
with
Big
Data,
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/opinion/eight-no-nine-problems-with-bigdata.html [https://perma.cc/CXE8-WT36].
143. For example, Intrado’s “Beware” system promises to provide “real time
threat scores” to police. Threat scores have real time consequences because they
affect and alter police response to a particular address. See THE RISE OF BIG DATA
POLICING, supra note 6, at 187.
144. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 155 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
The impact of database reliability issues continues to percolate through the courts.
See, e.g., United States v. Esquivel-Rios, 786 F.3d 1299, 1302 (10th Cir. 2015) (“This
court and others have regularly upheld traffic stops based on information that the
defendant’s vehicle’s registration failed to appear in a law enforcement database — at
least when the record suggested no reason to worry about the database’s reliability.”
(emphasis added)). Here, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that
there was evidence “suggesting that the database on which the officer relied to justify
his stop might bear a real problem — a problem that might mean a ‘no return’
doesn’t suggest criminal conduct but only some bureaucratic snafu.” Id.
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warning was not heeded, and as more governmental decisions become
automated, the situation has only worsened. Unfortunately, as we
have become a nation reliant on technology, “data error” has become
a mundane excuse that conceals real harm.
That data error has the potential to disrupt individual liberty is
made clear in police creation of gang databases. Law enforcement
conceptualizes gangs as a problem of racialized young men, as
evidenced by the fact that most people in gang databases are men of
color, most of whom do not have criminal records. 145 Being
incorrectly labeled a “gang member” has negative consequences not
only for the person so labeled, but also for those associated with such
person. 146 Since predictive policing technologies operate within these
racialized databases, the algorithms used in these systems cannot
avoid being racially discriminatory. 147
Data errors not only infect data sets created by commercial data
brokers or law enforcement — large government agencies, such as
state health and human services departments or education systems,
create, collect, and (often poorly) manage large amounts of data
pertaining to various populations. State agency data error is
comically widespread with potentially tragic results. 148 In Indiana’s
rush to privatize and automate its public benefits system, for example,
the state moved to a centralized document processing center. 149 So
much of the data either went missing or was incorrectly entered in
digital case files that the processing center became known as the
“black hole in Marion.” 150

145. RUTHANN ROBSON, DRESSING CONSTITUTIONALLY: HIERARCHY, SEXUALITY,
DEMOCRACY FROM OUR HAIRSTYLES TO OUR SHOES 124 (2013). In California,
a state auditor found systemic failures in gang databases including the listing of fortytwo infants as gang members. See also THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note
6, at 52.
146. Predictive policing uses social networking to link individuals to friends, family,
and associates, and uses this information to target those connected to the initial
target. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1109, 1137–38, 1140 (2017).
147. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 53.
148. See, e.g., Zynda v. Arwood, 175 F. Supp. 3d 791, 806 (E.D. Mich. 2016)
(deciding that allegations of high error rate in an unemployment fraud detection
system supported standing for legal services office); State of New Mexico ex rel.
Stewart v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep’t, D-101-CV-2015-00409, at 24–27 (Santa Fe County
Ct. Dec. 2, 2015) (noting large numbers of errors in data used in teacher assessment
system, suggesting the system could not be trusted); K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp.
3d 703, 711–12 (D. Idaho 2016) (describing the massive errors in Idaho’s Medicaid
data base).
149. See EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 50.
150. Id.
AND
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Automating the processing of public benefits not only increases the
chance for data error through centralization, but also by drastically
reducing the number of caseworkers assisting clients navigating public
benefits systems. 151 By reducing the ability to talk to a human
caseworker who can resolve errors and mistakes, these systems create
an inflexible process where data error, no matter how inconsequential
or inadvertent, no matter whose fault, is deemed a “failure to
cooperate,” 152 which is the bureaucratic conclusion that terminates
someone’s healthcare, food stamps, or housing allotment. The
landscape of state attempts to automate their benefit systems is
littered with thousands of people in dire circumstances who, because
of data error, lost their benefits. 153 The designation of “failure to
cooperate,” especially when it emanates from an automated system
that minimizes the ability to engage with another human being to
solve the problem, is dehumanizing, frightening, and destabilizing. 154
Data errors contained in the large data sets used by governments
are almost impossible to challenge or correct, 155 not to mention that
the existence of the databases themselves is often kept secret. 156
Because predictive analytics require as much data as possible in order
to function, private companies and public agencies are inclined to use
data even when they know it is wrong. For example, the officials
using analytics to predict child maltreatment in Allegheny County
argued that allowing parents to expunge hotline reports on their

151. Id. at 62–63; see also Perdue v. Murphy, 915 N.E.2d 498, 501 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009) (noting that because of the loss of caseworkers, “[w]hile it is mathematically
possible, it is unlikely that a client calling about his or her case would speak to the
same employee each time”).
152. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 53; see also supra note 98 and accompanying text
(noting how systems are tuned so that all errors run against the recipient).
153. See, e.g., supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text; see also EUBANKS, supra
note 6, at 53 (describing in detail the impact of data error in attempted automation of
Indiana’s public benefit system).
154. See EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 53, 70 (providing narratives from some of those
harmed by Indiana’s implementation of its privatized benefits system).
155. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 62 (discussing the fact that
there are no processes for correcting errors in many police documents such as rap
sheets and arrest records); Rebecca A. Hufstader, Immigration Reliance on Gang
Databases: Unchecked Discretion and Undesirable Consequences, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
671, 680 (2015) (noting how difficult it is to challenge being incorrectly listed in a
gang database, and that most people are unaware they may be included in a gang
database because the databases are considered confidential).
156. Many law enforcement or security databases remain secret. See Margaret Hu,
Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1745–46 (2015) (law enforcement
databases classified or confidential); see also Hufstader, supra note 155, at 684 (gang
data bases as confidential).
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children, no matter how spurious, would rob the agency of critical
However, without expungement, this misleading and
data. 157
erroneous data will continue to be used by the algorithm to score
children and families in the future.
In addition to data error, there is the issue of who is included and
who is missing from data sets. Wealth and social privilege provide
protections from aggressive police surveillance, creating a data gap
that can shield the privileged from predictive policing systems. 158 In
contrast, poverty and race attract over-policing and hypersurveillance, which disproportionately populates police databases
with information on poor communities and people of color. 159 Given
that predictive algorithms learn from the data sets they analyze,
predictive policing algorithms based on skewed crime data replicate
and exacerbate preexisting biases already inherent in the system.
Similar problems exist in algorithms built to predict child
maltreatment. These algorithms analyze data regarding a person’s
history of public assistance, drug use and mental health issues, as well
as their past experiences with the child welfare or the juvenile justice
systems, to determine risk scores. 160 This is information based almost
entirely on whether someone uses public services or has contact with
the criminal justice system. Missing almost completely, however, is
data on people able to access private drug or alcohol treatment,
mental health services, financial support, or who were able, based on
social privilege, to minimize contact with the criminal justice

157. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 164. See also Humphries v. County of Los Angeles,
554 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that California refused to expunge parents
from a child abuse database even when the parents were found “factually innocent”).
158. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 180 (describing how private
property, economic mobility, and social status create significantly different data
patterns for rich and poor persons, and how, in a data driven policing system, that
difference would give the wealthy a “presumption of data driven innocence”).
159. Id. at 75 (describing discrepancies in police stops and searches of people of
color, primarily black men in Ferguson, Missouri, and discussing police targeting Skid
Row with facial recognition technology and focused data collection via aerial
surveillance over West Baltimore — a predominately African-American community).
160. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. While this Article is focused
on the issues surrounding the use of algorithmic mechanisms to control marginalized
populations in the United States, similar systems, often built by the same private
companies, are being implemented globally. In the United Kingdom, a similar system
monitoring families reviews data on debt, worklessness, benefits, housing, domestic
violence, and anti-social behavior, among other factors, to create a “family profile.”
Luke Stevenson, Artificial Intelligence: How a Council Seeks to Predict Support
Needs for Children and Families, COMMUNITY CARE (Mar. 1, 2018),
http://www.communitycare.co.uk/2018/03/01/artificial-intelligence-council-seekspredict-support-needs-children-families/ [https://perma.cc/YR7V-Z9GL].
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system. 161 Thus, those who can access private programs and support
services will disproportionately receive lower risk scores, regardless of
their individual likelihood to harm their children, than those using
similar services provided by the county.
With algorithmic decision-making, what counts is the content of the
data set, even if that content is unreliable, biased, or just plain wrong.
Because problematic algorithms rely on flawed and biased data sets,
governmental decision-making is bound to repeat and reinforce the
already existing discrimination and bias created by past conduct used
to control marginalized populations. To successfully challenge
government adoption of these technologies, it is important to
understand the psychology, history, and politics driving their use.
II. FORCES DRIVING GOVERNMENT ADOPTION OF BIG DATA
ANALYTICS
Algorithmic decision-making systems are often promoted with
claims of efficiency, cost savings, and reduction of human bias. 162 But
they are also sold to the public using language that politicizes poverty
and crime. For example, Indiana’s governor characterized the state’s
welfare system as “wasteful, fraudulent,” and “broken beyond the
ability of state employees to fix it” in order to sell the public on a
costly new automated system designed and managed by a private
corporation. 163 Predictive policing systems are described as raceneutral and “objective” tools, even though they allow the
continuation of aggressive policing practices. 164
The language used to champion these technologies mirrors the
forces driving governments to employ them: a deference to science
and technology, the historical success of technological social control
mechanisms, and the neoliberal embrace of privatization. To
successfully challenge predictive algorithms and the social control
mechanisms they perpetuate, advocates must not only understand the
technology, they must understand the forces driving its adoption.

161. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 147. When asked whether the county was going to
seek information from private providers, administrators said they wanted private
data but receiving it was likely impossible. Id. at 157.
162. Id. at 9; THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 6.
163. These political claims were highly contested. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 46. In
addition, Indiana signed a billion-dollar contract with a private company to develop
the system after only one public hearing. Id. at 48.
164. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 6.
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A. Deference to Science and Technology
Governments at all levels are flocking to predictive technologies
that “bear the glossy veneer of science,” 165 driven in large part by
This is one
perceptions that the technology is infallible. 166
instantiation of automation bias — the human tendency to disregard
contradictory information in light of computer-generated solutions.167
This bias can lead those using decision-making technologies to rely on
automated decisions even when they suspect a system has
malfunctioned. 168 Uncritical deference to technology is aggravated
by the inability of those outside the technical community to
understand algorithms or the science behind predictive analytics. 169
This technological ignorance adds to the mystique of algorithmic
infallibility, giving many a distorted, subservient, almost “theological
view” of computational accuracy. 170
Automation bias subconsciously alters behavior. The developers
of the Allegheny County child welfare algorithm claimed that the
predictive system was designed so that risk scores it generates would
be questioned by intake screeners. 171 In actuality, screeners started to
defer to the system — in some instances, screeners asked managers
for permission to go back and change their initial risk assessment
scores if the algorithm produced a different score. 172 Similarly, some
police officers have shifted their patrol patterns in response to overreliance on various predictive policing tools. For example, officers in

165. Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1) (on file with authors).
166. Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms
and the Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2017).
167. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in
a Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 711–12 (2010).
168. See Citron, supra note 1, at 1271 (noting that literature in the field of cognitive
systems engineering finds that humans view automated systems as error-resistant and
rely on computer output even when they suspect a system malfunction).
169. Bamberger, supra note 167, at 712; see also Harry Surden, Values Embedded
in Legal Artificial Intelligence (U. Colo. L. Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 17-17,
Oct. 18, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2932333 [http://perma.cc/3RUC-54PP]
(arguing that algorithmic recommendations in sentencing creates an illusion of how
mathematical “objectivity” can mask underlying subjective human judgments of
system designers).
170. Ian Bogost, The Cathedral of Computation, ATLANTIC (Jan. 15, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/01/the-cathedral-ofcomputation/384300 [https://perma.cc/P4AA-UNJ7].
171. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 141 (noting that the developer insisted the model
was built in such a way that the screeners would question its predictive accuracy and
trust their own judgment).
172. Id. at 142.
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Los Angeles working with a predictive policing system that
highlighted potential crime geographically became overly focused on
the areas highlighted by the system, to the point where they had to be
explicitly trained to patrol “outside the box.” 173
But automation bias can result in more frightening results.
Consider the arrest of Denise Green, a 47-year-old African American
municipal worker with health and mobility issues. Late one evening,
Ms. Green was pulled over, forced out of her car, told to kneel in the
street, and handcuffed as four officers pointed their weapons at
her. 174 Ms. Green was stopped because police responded to a faulty
alert from an Automatic License Plate Reader (ALPR). 175 As the
court noted, ALPR systems are known for “false hits,” and police
protocol required the officers to independently verify the validity of
the information prior to executing a stop. 176
Ms. Green’s experience is indicative not only of police overdependence on big data analytics, but also of the structural and
implicit racism that leads to over policing. 177 Because of the known
flaws in our preexisting social structures, the officers were trained that
an ALPR “hit” by itself did not justify a vehicle stop. But the officer
who stopped Ms. Green not only failed to verify the validity of the
license plate number, he instituted a “high risk” felony stop of the
vehicle. 178 This stop was so intrusive a court held that a rational jury
could find that it amounted to an unlawful arrest. 179 While Ms. Green
was “merely” frightened and humiliated, given the history of police
violence against unarmed black people, 180 the incident could have
turned out far worse.
Deference to science and technology is a component of
governmental misuse of algorithmic decision-making tools, but it also
reinforces preexisting individual biases. Predictive technologies
reproduce societal discrimination, but the tools are also used by

173. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 80.
174. Green v. County of San Francisco, 751 F.3d. 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2014).
175. Id. (reversing and remanding the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for
the City finding that the officers never visually confirmed the license plate match).
176. Id. at 1042.
177. See generally Robert J. Smith et al., Implicit White Favoritism in the Criminal
Justice System, 66 ALA. L. REV. 871 (2015) (describing the implicit racial bias in the
criminal justice system and arguing that in addition to implicit and structural bias
there is also a structural white favoritism).
178. Green, 751 F.3d. at 1043.
179. Id. at 1047–48.
180. See, e.g., Paul-Emile, supra note 26, at 308 (noting increased violence against
unarmed black people).
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individuals with their own inherent biases, implicit or explicit. Thus,
deference to technology is superimposed on and reinforces individual
bias. This creates a situation in which people of color are far more
likely to be harmed by officers relying on algorithmic decision-making
tools, especially where system outputs coincide with and thus
“confirm” an individual officer’s own biases. 181
Automation bias also exists within the judicial system. Judges are
not immune from the “gravitational pull” 182 of scientific evidence that
appears neutral and objective. 183 Case law is littered with instances of
courts admitting now discredited “scientific” evidence, such as bitemark testimony or firearm and toolmark identifications. 184 The
discrediting of this evidence came not from new advances in science,
but from persistent challenges that the evidence was never valid in the
first place. 185 Because courts failed to require validation of new
claims of scientifically reliable evidence, much of what is now
considered “junk science” gained a foothold in the justice system. 186
This is of particular concern in criminal and family court, which are
far more lenient in admitting scientific evidence proffered by the state
than by those challenging the state. 187 Given that states are already

181. Rich, supra note 8, at 899–900 (discussing how individual officer bias inhibits
an officer from determining that an automated suspicion algorithm is wrong when the
information coincides with the officer’s own biases); L. Song Richardson, Police
Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1146–51 (2012) (discussing
the extensive studies showing impact of implicit bias, especially against black men).
182. Clare Huntington, The Empirical Turn in Family Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV.
227, 287 (2018).
183. See id. at 232–33 (2018) (stating that because empirical evidence appears
neutral, the State can argue that it is following the algorithm and thus evade engaging
in difficult and complex child welfare issues); see also Citron, supra note 1, at 1254
(noting that hearing officers in benefits proceedings are likely to trust the computersupported decision until and unless appellants can produce expert testimony showing
potential for error).
184. See Simon A. Cole, Changed Science Statutes: Can Courts Accommodate
Accelerating Forensic Scientific and Technological Change, 57 JURIMETRICS J. 443,
446 (2017) (discussing scientific experts who proffered incriminating testimony at trial
and subsequently came to doubt their original testimony).
185. Id. at 453–55.
186. Id. at 457.
187. Stephanie L. Damon-Moore, Trial Judges and the Forensic Science Problem,
92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1532, 1535 n.18 (2017). While Damon-Moore focuses on criminal
cases, child welfare and even benefits administration has come to mimic the criminal
justice system in its function of controlling marginalized populations. Child welfare is
an area of law that has long allowed a wide array of so-called “syndromes” and other
“scientific” evidence to support claims of child abuse. See generally Maxine Eichner,
Bad Medicine: Parents, the State, and the Charge of Medical Child Abuse, 50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 205 (2016).

2019]

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

397

introducing machine learning algorithms into their law enforcement
and child welfare systems, the next step may well be attempting to
introduce risk scores as “scientific” evidence supporting probable
cause or child maltreatment, based on claims that predictive
algorithms are objective, neutral, and technologically sound.
Uncritical reliance on technological decision-making tools also
interacts with and reinforces other biases. One such example is the
“anchor effect,” a cognitive bias that describes the human tendency to
adjust judgments or assessments in response to previously disclosed
external information — an “anchor.” 188 In criminal sentencing,
appellate courts are beginning to examine how initial sentencing
recommendations may improperly “anchor” judges to an improper
and inflated sentencing range. 189 The anchoring effect occurs even
when the initial anchor is implausible, although the effect on a
decision-maker is greater when the initial anchor is plausible. 190
Consider these combined biases in the context of algorithmic risk
assessment systems: automation bias makes an algorithmic risk
assessment score seem “more plausible,” while the anchoring effect
maximizes the algorithm’s impact on the decision-making process.
Because these psychological forces occur unconsciously, 191 bias and
errors in judgment stemming from them go undetected. 192 As more
aggressive discriminatory biases are layered on top of problematic but
socially benign ones, it becomes clear that algorithmic systems of
social control do not only harm people, but also create real and
significant obstacles for those attempting to challenge their use.
Deference to technology also makes disputing technological
determinations expensive and unattainable for those who cannot

188. Hon. Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and
“Blind Spot” Biases in Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a
Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 495 (2014).
189. See, e.g., United States v. Navarro, 817 F.3d 494, 501 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting
that an improper upper guidelines number offered by the government may well have
anchored the district judge to an inflated sentencing range); United States v. Ingram,
721 F.3d 35, 40–41 (2d Cir. 2013) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (noting that a two-step
process requiring judicial discussion of individual factors can reduce the anchoring
effect in sentencing).
190. Bennett, supra note 188, at 499–500. The anchoring effect would influence
anyone working with a risk assessment tool that produces a numerical score including
those used in child welfare. Id.
191. Id. at 491 (describing unconscious reliance on mental shortcuts and heuristics
when making complex decisions).
192. Id. at 491–92 (pointing out that because the cognitive biases are hidden, judges
(and others) often actively resist the suggestion that their decisions have been
affected by them).
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afford the experts necessary to establish system error. Arkansas’s
adoption of a new algorithmic assessment program for Medicaid
inexplicably and drastically reduced benefits to many recipients. 193 It
was not until the developer of the algorithm was actually testifying at
trial, when he was asked to walk the court through the algorithmic
decision-making system, that the specific system errors were
discovered. 194 This occurred after months of costly federal litigation,
thousands of attorney hours, 195 and, most importantly, loss of medical
coverage for many recipients.
Problematically and predictably, Arkansas was implementing the
algorithm in a “low rights environments,” where there is little
expectation of political accountability and those affected have no
right to counsel. 196 Governments implement algorithmic decisionmaking in ways that primarily target already marginalized
populations — whether they are focused on reducing welfare rolls or
services to the homeless, minimizing support for the disabled,
targeting communities of color with predictive policing tactics, or
screening people into or out of the state’s child welfare systems. The
communities most affected by such predictive algorithms must
generally rely on underfinanced and understaffed public defender or
civil legal services offices to challenge these systems. For those
unable to challenge government actions, officials may claim they have
waived any right to appeal, even if it is later determined the
algorithms used were flawed. 197

193. Complaint at ¶¶ 39–46, 56–61, Jacobs ex rel. v. Gillespie, 3:16-cv-00119 (E.D.
Ark. 2016) (on file with author) (alleging that the assessment algorithm violated due
process, because the basis upon which the algorithm made determinations was never
provided, which made it impossible for a recipient to challenge a reduction in
services).
194. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. As the Legal Aid attorney for the
plaintiff pointed out, the mistake was only detected because the one person in the
world who could discover it was testifying. Jacobs Trial Transcript, supra note 124, at
43.
195. As plaintiff’s counsel said, “There’s this immensely complex system around
which no standards have been published, so that no one in their agency caught it until
we initiated federal litigation and spent hundreds of hours and thousands of dollars to
get here today.” Lecher, supra note 40.
196. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 12. There is no right to counsel for those
challenging reductions in public benefits such as welfare, food stamps, public housing,
and Medicaid.
197. See Lecher, supra note 40. When Arkansas officials learned of the coding
error that miscalculated benefits that were due to recipients with cerebral palsy, some
officials suggested that recipients who failed to file a timely appeal had waived their
rights to the correct benefits, even though no one, including the state officials, knew
the algorithm was wrong.
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This use of technologies to control marginalized populations is not
a coincidence and is not new. The technology allows those in
positions of power to sift and sort people — those deserving of aid
and support versus those whom society sees as undeserving,
dangerous, or criminal. 198 Governments have used technology to
contain, control, and criminalize people for hundreds of years,
sometimes with spectacularly horrific results.
B. Historical Success of Technology as Domestic Social Control
Mechanism
The ability to collect, store, sort, and sift through information
about individuals is what has allowed governments to track,
stigmatize, and ultimately punish entire populations. Some critics of
algorithmic governance systems posit the technology as tremendously
useful, but acknowledge it has the capacity to reinforce existing bias
and over-criminalize communities of color. 199 Other critics suggest
that governments view this technologically enhanced capacity for
controlling and criminalizing targeted communities as a feature, not a
bug. 200 The latter of these two views is soundly supported by history.
Virginia Eubanks uses the concept of a “digital poorhouse” to
compare how the poor and disabled are controlled and managed by
state authorized algorithms today with how this population was
controlled and managed by the institution of the poorhouse in the
1800s. 201 Eubanks also documents how the United States has evolved
in its management of poor populations — from the use of the
poorhouse to “scientific charity,” 202 where caseworkers began to
investigate and separate the deserving from the undeserving poor in a

198. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 8–9, 123, 176–77.
199. See, e.g., THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 131–36
(discussing the racist roots of policing and the need for predictive policing systems to
be developed to avoid racial bias).
200. See, e.g., EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 9–10 (noting how the targeting effects of
systems, which reduce aid to the poor in the name of efficiency); NOBLE, supra note
7, at 6, 31 (discussing how what many describe as “glitches” in otherwise “near
perfect” technology are not mistakes, but either intentional or incredibly reckless
coding, and exploring how search algorithms maintain racial and gender subjugation).
201. Reminiscent of the privatization of benefits systems today, the poorhouse was
brutal, dehumanizing, established in part to discourage the poor from seeking aid,
and often run as a business. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 16–18.
202. Id. at 15.
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quasi “moral classification” system, 203 and then from scientific charity
into the use of eugenics. 204
Combining white supremacy with fear of the other, eugenics was
embraced to protect society from African Americans and the
“shiftless, ignorant, and worthless class of anti-social whites.”205
Eugenics was considered a rigorous and data-driven science in its
day. 206 It also fit many other aspects of the Progressive Era — the
shift to planned capitalism, the reification of efficiency, and the rise of
middle class professional managers and scientific experts.207 The
Eugenics Record Office (ERO), overseen by a Harvard biologist and
established with funding from the Carnegie Institute, was created to
support a modern society by weeding out those considered unfit.208
To accomplish this, the ERO created a database of family pedigrees,
case studies, and indexed records from notes collected by trained field
workers. 209
The ERO, with its “scientific” methodology of data collection and
analysis, quickly began to influence government policy. In the 1920s,
scientists from the ERO recommended forced sterilization and antiimmigration laws, all based on “science” supported by “data and
records.” 210 In 1924, Congress passed an Immigration Act effectively
barring Eastern Europeans, Jews, Arabs, and East Asians from

203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 22–23.
Id.

Garland E. Allen, The Eugenics Record Office at Cold Spring Harbor, 1910–
1940: An Essay in Institutional History, OSIRIS 225, 226 (1986) (eugenics seen as

applying “generalized, predictive, and experimentally verifiable concepts of heredity
to all living forms); Joshua A. Krisch, When Racism Was a Science, N. Y. TIMES (Oct.
13, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/14/science/haunted-files-the-eugenicsrecord-office-recreates-a-dark-time-in-a-laboratorys-past.html
[https://perma.cc/D8SC-J9JY] (characterizing ERO as a premier scientific enterprise
in its heyday).
207. Allen, supra note 206, at 255; see also Krisch, supra note 206 (reporting that
eugenics started by progressive scientists to assist in creating a more efficient society).
208. Krisch, supra note 206 (progressive era scientists at the ERO intent on using
genetics to breed “better citizens”); Patrick J. Ryan, “Six Blacks from Home”:
Childhood, Motherhood, and Eugenics in America, 19 J. POL’Y HIST. 253, 255 (2007)
(describing the progressive era political embrace of eugenics as a mechanism to
address hereditary feeblemindedness as the root of social problems such as crime,
delinquency, and poverty).
209. Allen, supra note 206, at 240. See also Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory’s
Image Archive on the American Eugenics Movement, Eugenics Record Office,
http://eugenicsarchive.org/html/eugenics/static/themes/20.html
[https://perma.cc/X7BW-B9ZX] (describing the history and work of the ERO).
210. Krisch, supra note 206.
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entering the country. 211 At the state level, thousands of people were
deemed “unfit” and sterilized. 212 At the time, eugenics served as a
science on which to base legal and policy decisions. Today, historians
look back and see a pseudo-science sold to legislators and the public
that was built on flawed methodologies and evidence that “resonated
with social prejudices.” 213
Following the Progressive Era of the early twentieth century, the
“science” of eugenics was combined with even greater technological
sorting power to assist two of the worst modern-day authoritarian
governments in cataloging and culling their citizenry. Nazi Germany
and Apartheid South Africa are specters of what “high-tech social
sorting” tools can do in countries with severe inequality and
totalitarian regimes. 214 Because governments in the United States are
actively using predictive analytics to target portions of the American
populace, expanding briefly on this history is not an exercise in
hyperbole. Rather, it is important to understand how dangerous it
can be to wed technology to discrimination through law and policy. 215
Beginning in 1933, Nazi Germany used a pre-computer punch card
system to organize and register its entire population. 216 Once laws
were passed that allowed Jews and others deemed unfit to be
segregated, stripped of their rights, and ultimately murdered, it was
this punch card system, developed by IBM, that created the
organizational efficiency that made the Holocaust so catastrophic.217
The punch card system also allowed the Nazi government to manage
the massive logistics of the camps so that one’s identity as Jew,

211. See Katie Kelly, Enforcing Stereotypes: The Self-Fulfilling Prophecies of U.S.
Immigration Enforcement, 66 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 36, 43–44 (2018)

(discussing the Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153 (1924)).
212. Krisch, supra note 206. In 1927, with Chief Justice Holmes declaring “three
generations of imbeciles are enough,” the Supreme Court upheld Virginia’s
compulsory sterilization law. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
213. See Krisch, supra note 206.
214. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 199.
215. See, e.g., Bret D. Asbury, “Backdoor to Eugenics?”: The Risk of Prenatal
Diagnosis for Poor Black Women, 23 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 (2015)
(connecting the racist aspects of the eugenics movement to the degradation of black
women’s reproductive rights and arguing this history may still be impacting the
prenatal genetic counseling provided to poor black women). See also Ryan, supra
note 208, at 274 (seeing eugenics as a constituent part of an ongoing American
poverty discourse, rather than a bizarre movement tucked neatly away prior to the
Nazi Holocaust, is ever more important at the dawn of the twenty-first century).
216. EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE HOLOCAUST: THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE
BETWEEN NAZI GERMANY AND AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL CORPORATION 54–60
(2001).
217. Id. at 8.
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Jehovah’s Witness, homosexual, work shy, or otherwise cast as asocial
or unfit, could never be escaped. 218
This marriage of social prejudice and technology repeated itself in
South Africa. There, to denationalize the non-white population, a
complex system of data collection and analysis was institutionalized to
sort and track individuals by race. 219 The social engineering that
stripped black South Africans of their citizenship was accomplished in
large part through advances in computerization that supported the
manipulation of the huge amounts of data necessary to establish the
passbook system. 220 The passbooks, along with a central registry,
worked to “recast raw minority domination as a technological
project.” 221
In each of these examples, prejudice and computerization (or its
punch code predecessor) enabled an authoritarian government to
collect information on vulnerable populations and then sort, track,
and target that population in horrendous ways. 222 This is not to say
that governmental use of technology will always result in atrocities.
But at a time when there is more analyzable data on everyone than
ever before, when governmental entities continue to take
questionable steps to keep various types of surveillance technology
secret, to ignore this history is naïve at best. As the social control
functionality of these tools continues to expand, so does
governmental interest in their use.

218. Id. at 364–65. The five-digit code assigned to each person became part of the
numbers tattooed on those in the prison camps. Id. at 356.
219. Paul N. Edwards & Gabrielle Hecht, History and the Technopolitics of
Identity: The Case of Apartheid South Africa, 36 J. SOUTHERN AFR. STUD. 619
(2010); see also Consolidated and Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 130–141, In re South
African Apartheid Litigation, 02 MDL No. 1499 (JES) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2008) (on
file with author) (explaining IBM’s role in creating the South African passbook
system).
220. Keith Breckenridge, The Book of Life: The South African Population
Register and the Invention of Racial Descent, 1950–1980, 40 KRONOS SOUTH
AFRICAN HISTORIES 225, 235 (2014). For black South Africans, the “Book of Life”
became the passbook that stripped them of their citizenship and controlled their
ability to work or travel in and around South Africa. Id.
221. Edwards & Hecht, supra note 219, at 628.
222. The United States government also used the technology of the day to monitor
and control suspect communities, under the infamous COINTELPRO program. See
ROBERT SCHEER, THEY KNOW EVERYTHING ABOUT YOU 34–35, 170 (2015). Past
domestic governmental surveillance also seems eerily parallel to current surveillance
targeting black communities. See Amna Toor, “Our Identity Is Often What’s

Triggering Surveillance”: How Government Surveillance of #Blacklivesmatter
Violates the First Amendment Freedom of Association, 44 RUTGERS COMPUTER &

TECH. L.J. 286, 295–96 (2018).
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Predictive analytics and machine learning continue to evolve as
developers push the “predictive” capacity of algorithms further into
the lives of targeted populations. The algorithm developed to predict
child maltreatment in Allegheny County, for example, is apparently
being expanded to apply to every child born in that county. 223 In
addition, a well-known developer of risk assessment modeling is
working on an algorithm to predict, at the moment of birth, whether a
person will commit a crime by his or her eighteenth birthday, based
on environmental factors and parental history. 224 Such an approach,
which assumes a connection between genetics and criminality, has
been described as a eugenics approach to fighting crime — an
approach which could lead to forced sterilization, 225 this time directed
not by the science of the 1920s but by the big data analytics of the
2020s.
Efforts to extend the capacity of algorithmic social control
technologies coincides with China’s development of one of the most
ambitious predictive policing systems in the world. The Chinese
government has amassed a database with information on each and
every citizen, and is using predictive analytics to monitor and ensure
“social stability.” 226 All this makes one law enforcement vendor’s

223. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 171. This expansion of application to all children at
birth is counter to the ethical review of the system, which found it “significant” that
the AFST was being applied to call screening and not to all children at birth. TIM
DARE & EILEEN GAMBRILL, ETHICAL ANALYSIS: PREDICTIVE RISK MODELS AT CALL
SCREENING
FOR
ALLEGHENY
COUNTY
2
(2017),
http://alleghenycountypa.gov/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=644
2457402 [https://perma.cc/T9UR-G583].
224. See Brustein, supra note 69.
225. Caryn Devins et al., The Law and Big Data, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
357, 397 (2017) (discussing how a biosocial approach to crime assumes that genetic
factors contribute to criminality and supports curtailing the reproductive capacity of
people with “crime prone genes by administering anti-androgens to young post
pubertal males at high risk of offending”). A mandatory eugenics approach to
criminal justice is not far from where we find ourselves today — several states have
chemical castration laws for sex offenders that either allow a judge to mandate the
use of the drugs or allow a defendant to elect to take the drugs as a condition for
release. See Zachary Edmonds Oswald, “Off With His ____”: Analyzing the Sex
Disparity in Chemical Castration Sentences, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 471, 483–84
(2013). Family courts have, and continue to, issue no-pregnancy orders even though
such orders are likely unconstitutional. See Laura T. Kessler, A Sordid Case: Stump
v. Sparkman, Judicial Immunity, and the Other Side of Reproductive Rights, 74 MD.
L. REV. 833, 909–10 (2015).
226. The Chinese government has amassed a database on all its citizen and is using
predictive analytics to monitor them. See Bryont Chin, From Tragedy to Statistic:
How Big Data Has Changed the Practice of Law, 9 SING. L. REV. 3 (2018),
http://www.singaporelawreview.com/juris-illuminae-entries/2018/from-tragedy-tostatistic-how-big-data-has-changed-the-practice-of-law
[https://perma.cc/4ZAD-
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marketing claim that it can leverage big data analytics “to anticipate
criminal activity” and “predict future events” 227 less unrealistic than it
may initially seem.
Big data analytics promises to governments the ability to collect
tremendous amounts of data on individuals and then sort, track, and
target them at will. In each of the examples above, private individuals
and companies — third parties — played outsized roles in the
automation of authoritarianism. Whether it is the lure of money,
prestige, or prejudice, third parties have been and remain one of the
driving forces in governmental adoption of the technologies necessary
for algorithmically guided social control.
C. Private Sector Profitability
Privatization of police and social services functions limits
democratic transparency, increases the market for algorithmic
decision-making
technology,
and
ultimately
undermines
governmental responsibility to individuals. We are well into an era of
hyper-privatization, with a well-documented reduction in government
spending and a concurrent attempt to shift much of governmental
responsibility to the private sector. 228 This is exacerbated by the fact
that most governments, especially local or state governments, do not
have the capacity to develop predictive analytic systems without help
from private companies or non-profit organizations. 229 This need for
outside expertise coincides with neoliberal demands to privatize
provision of the social safety net. 230
L2GP]. See also China: Police ‘Big Data’ Systems Violate Privacy, Target Dissent,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 19, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/19/chinapolice-big-data-systems-violate-privacy-target-dissent [https://perma.cc/4AJX-2FZ6]
(describing China’s Police Cloud system).
227. AXON, LAW ENFORCEMENT TECHNOLOGY REPORT 22–23 (2017),
https://prismic-io.s3.amazonaws.com/axon%2F3f45a833-2abf-417b-ba489f77b130b025_2017-le-tech-trends-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQM4-S7ED]. Axon
was formerly called Taser International, and is attempting to corner the market in
police body cameras, along with controlling and analyzing the data the cameras
collect. Gelles, supra note 59.
228. See, e.g., Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the
Privatization of Dependency, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 415, 416 n.1
(2005) (documenting the dismantling of the Keynesian welfare state). See also Ingrid
V. Eagly & Joanna C. Schwartz, Lexipol: The Privatization of Police Policymaking,
96 TEX. L. REV. 891 (2018) (describing the hidden but significant role of one private
company in police policymaking).
229. Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 95, at 107.
230. Ann Cammett, Welfare Queens Redux: Criminalizing Black Mothers in the
Age of Neoliberalism, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 363, 363–65 (2016) (describing
neoliberal goals of privatizing core aspects of the social safety nets such as pensions,
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Government contracts associated with developing and
implementing algorithmic decision-making tools are highly profitable.
The companies selected to privatize Indiana’s benefits system, for
example, received a billion-dollar contract. 231 While costs vary, child
welfare analytics cost states hundreds of thousands of dollars.232
Companies profit not only from the development of the algorithms,
but also from maintaining the data sets the algorithms process. 233 In
addition to money, companies that provide data analytics to
governments gain access to data they may not have had otherwise. 234
Given these rewards, it is no surprise that private companies and
non-profits are developing algorithmic decision-making technologies
and offering them to governments with an eye towards future
markets.
The child maltreatment algorithm implemented in
Allegheny County, first developed for use in New Zealand, 235 is
already being marketed to other states. 236 The company that
provided aerial surveillance footage to the Baltimore Police

education, healthcare, childcare and the prison system). Indiana’s former Governor,
Mitch Daniels, had what was described as a “Yellow Pages” approach to
privatization: if a product or service was offered in the Yellow Pages, government
should not provide it. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 45. Mississippi recently passed a law
not only requiring its Department of Human Services to develop an automated
eligibility and fraud detection system, but mandating that the state use an outside
vendor to do so. See 2017 MISS. LAWS CH. 421 §3(2)(b)(2).
231. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 48.
232. Jackson & Marx, supra note 87 (noting that the Illinois system costed
$366,000). The developer of the surveillance flights operated above Baltimore
estimated that a long-term contract with a single police department could be worth
two million dollars a year. Monte Reel, Secret Cameras Record Baltimore’s Every
BLOOMBERG
(Aug.
23,
2016),
Move
from
Above,
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-baltimore-secret-surveillance/
[https://perma.cc/9GKZ-VS5C].
233. Axon’s (formerly Taser’s) contract for five years of data storage with the city
of Birmingham, Alabama, is valued at $899,000, not including the one-time costs of
the cameras. See Joh, supra note 58, at 115.
234. Ali Winston, Palantir Has Secretly Been Using New Orleans to Test Its
Predictive
Policing
Technology,
VERGE
(Feb.
27,
2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/27/17054740/palantir-predictive-policing-tool-neworleans-nopd [https://perma.cc/5ER2-R3FZ] (reporting that New Orleans granted
Palantir access to city civil and criminal databases, as well as access to the city’s
LexisNexis Accurint product, which is comprised of millions of searchable public
records, court filings, licenses, addresses, phone numbers, and social media data).
235. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
236. Richard Wexler, Opinion, The Scarlet Number: Is Pittsburgh’s Ethically Risky
System of Big Data for Foster Care Coming to California?, WITNESSLA (Apr. 5,
2018), https://witnessla.com/op-ed-the-scarlet-number-is-pittsburghs-ethically-riskysystem-of-big-data-for-foster-care-coming-to-california/
[https://perma.cc/WB752W6L] (reporting that the California Department of Social Services has contracted
with one of the developers of the Allegheny County AFST tool).

406

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVI

Department is considering using the expertise gained and raw data
developed while surveilling the city to market its system to auto
insurance companies. 237 Facial recognition software was donated to
an Arizona school system with the hope of developing a market for
the technology in schools. 238 Amazon designed a facial recognition
system that it is currently marketing to various law enforcement
agencies. 239
Using private vendors to build algorithmic social control
technologies is problematic for a variety of reasons not the least of
which is that it increases opacity and lack of accountability. Not only
are government officials, who are implementing the predictive
systems, generally unable to explain them, 240 they are often
prohibited from providing information because the algorithms and
the analysis produced are considered a proprietary secret by third
party developers. 241 A recent study directed Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) requests to a variety of state and local agencies as part of
a project to test how responsive government agencies would be to
requests for information about predictive analytics. 242 While not the

237. Kevin Rector, As Police Weigh Surveillance Program, Private Company at
Looks to Court Private Clients, BALT. SUN (Oct. 7, 2016),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-surveillancealternatives-20161007-story.html [https://perma.cc/4EPZ-SDRH].
238. See Torin Monahan, The Surveillance Curriculum: Risk Management and
Social Control in the Neoliberal School, in SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY, supra note
21, at 110.
239. See Matt Cagle & Nicole A. Ozer, Amazon Teams up with Law Enforcement
to Deploy Dangerous New Face Recognition Technology, ACLU OF N. CAL. (May
22,
2018),
https://www.aclunc.org/blog/amazon-teams-law-enforcement-deploydangerous-new-face-recognition-technology [https://perma.cc/WYF4-7XDT]; Martin
Kaste, Orlando Police Testing Amazon’s Real-Time Facial Recognition, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (May 22, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/05/22/613115969/orlando-policetesting-amazons-real-time-facial-recognition [https://perma.cc/55BG-WHP2].
240. See supra notes 41–48 and accompanying text.
241. See Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F.
Supp. 3d 1168, 1177 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (private vendor refused to provide algorithm
used to terminate teachers, arguing the codes were trade secrets); K.W. v. Armstrong,
180 F. Supp. 3d 703, 717 (D. Idaho 2016) (the state refused to release algorithmic
scoring information in Medicaid dispute, claiming vendor copyright protections).
Claims that most algorithms contain proprietary information that cannot be released
without the permission of the developer are what undercut New York City’s attempt
to legislate transparency in algorithmic decision-making technologies. Julia Powles,
New York City’s Bold, Flawed Attempt to Make Algorithms Accountable, NEW
YORKER (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/new-york-citysbold-flawed-attempt-to-make-algorithms-accountable
[https://perma.cc/DK2GTMF5].
242. Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 95, at 136 (describing their methodology
and listing the systems they sought information on as the Public Safety Assessment,

Helm
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only obstacle to transparency, the study found that aggressive trade
secret claims and NDAs were a major hurdle in obtaining information
about the predictive systems. 243 This lack of transparency about the
algorithms creates a lack of accountability that implicates all the
issues of bias and unfairness inherent in big data analytics.
Finally, privatization of services meant to provide support to
recipients has consequences for how we care for others in need, and
fundamentally alters the relationship between those delivering
services and those receiving them. Privatization of government
programs such as welfare and Medicaid is often seen as a way to
reduce both the size of government and cut spending on the poor.244
Contracts often include explicit incentives for outside contractors to
cut caseloads, regardless of recipient need. 245 For example, the
performance metrics in Indiana’s automated benefits system created
incentives for the company running the system to close benefits cases
In addition to churning cases, the company
prematurely. 246
eliminated professional caseworkers and limited human discretion by
removing it from frontline service workers, vesting decision-making
almost entirely in the computer system. 247 All of this served one
purpose — making it as hard as possible to receive any public
assistance, regardless of whether one was entitled to it or not.
Governmental deployment of predictive technologies to manage,
track, and control marginalized populations is increasing as the tools

the Eckerd Rapid Safety Feedback system, the Allegheny Family Screening Tool,
PredPol, HunchLab, and the New York City Value-Added Measure).
243. Id. at 153–54.
244. See Geneva Brown, Ain’t I A Victim? The Intersectionality of Race, Class,
and Gender in Domestic Violence and the Courtroom, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER
147, 160 (2012) (identifying key components of welfare reform as reduction in
expenditures, decrease in government bureaucracy, and increased privatization). See
generally Wendy A. Bach, Welfare Reform, Privatization, and Power: Reconfiguring
Administrative Law Structures from the Ground Up, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 275 (2009)
(attributing the privatization of benefits systems to shifts in federal law encouraging
states to reduce welfare spending and maximize private sector involvement in service
provision).
245. Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty
Programs, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1739, 1755 (2002) (describing privatization of its public
benefits program in which “contractors’ profits and losses depended on the amount
of money paid out to recipients — the less money for recipients, the more profits for
contractors”).
246. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 50–51. This is not to say that issues of economics
do not skew government analytic systems. Michigan’s implementation of the MiDAS
system with its 92% error rate increased the Unemployment Insurance Agency
coffers from three to sixty-nine million dollars. Charette, supra note 47.
247. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 80–81.

408

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVI

themselves are becoming more powerful and opaque. Given the
extent of government use of these systems, as well as the historic and
economic forces driving their adoption, it is unlikely that communities
will be able to completely proscribe their use. However, creative and
tenacious advocacy strategies can force governments to become more
transparent about how they use predictive systems and require
governments to adopt systems that minimize bias and provide for the
ability to test and audit the results.
III. TOWARD GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
Those grappling with how to diminish the risks associated with big
data analytics have offered many solutions, including demands for
auditing, 249 and required design
system transparency, 248
modifications. 250 It is clear that all these methods and others are
needed. At the same time, advocates and activists confronting
predictive algorithm systems must become ever more conversant in
how they work. Successful challenges must be multi-faceted, relying
on litigation and regulation, in addition to being supplemented and
guided by grassroots activism. Many of the legal doctrines and
strategies used to challenge governmental overreach in the past will
be useful guides for opposing current systems. Regulations can create
mechanisms for public notice and enforce transparency. However, it
is grassroots activism that will sustain the systematic opposition to
algorithmic social control systems necessary to limit their use.
A. Litigation
Courts are only beginning to address government use of
algorithmic decision-making technologies, 251 although they have been
248. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due
Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 25 (2014) (describing the

need for regulators to have access to data sets and source codes).
249. See Pauline Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 189, 190 (2017) (discussing how auditing system outputs can help determine
if protected groups are disproportionally affected).
250. Kroll et al., supra note 2, at 662 (arguing that predictive analytics should
include software verification technology).
251. See, e.g., Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251
F. Supp. 3d 1168 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (noting that use of private algorithms to terminate
teachers is an issue of first impression in the circuit); United States v. Esquivel-Rios,
786 F.3d 1299, 1302 (10th Cir. 2015) (noting that the possibility that database
unreliability would support a suppression motion in a criminal case is an issue the
circuit had not addressed). The goal of this piece is not a complete review of what
case law exists, but rather to highlight common arguments and strategies that have
been most successful.
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grappling with related issues, such as database errors, for many
years. 252 Recent decisions reveal a judiciary that is struggling to grasp
the technology and is relying on advocates to contextualize system
failures within the appropriate constitutional and statutory
frameworks, be they criminal or civil. 253 With the rise of predictive
policing tools, the concern in the criminal justice arena is that these
technologies will further dismantle the protections enshrined in the
Fourth Amendment. 254
Though not addressing predictive policing systems per se, several
United States Supreme Court Justices have recently raised privacy
concerns based on the aggregated nature of surveillance inherent in
big data analytics. 255 This concern crystalized in 2018 in Carpenter v.
United States. 256 There, the Court found that when police obtained
Cell Site Location Information (CSLI) held by wireless carriers, they
conducted a search that invaded the defendant’s reasonable
expectation of privacy, and that required a warrant. 257 In doing so,
the Court noted the “seismic shifts in digital technology that made

252. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 155 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the risk of error in criminal justice databases is “not slim”
and that “[i]naccuracies in expansive, interconnected collections of electronic
information raise grave concerns for individual liberty.”); Arizona v. Evans, 5114
U.S. 1, 17 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Surely it would not be reasonable for
the police to rely, say, on a recordkeeping system, their own or some other agency’s,
that has no mechanism to ensure its accuracy over time and that routinely leads to
false arrests, even years after the probable cause for any such arrest has ceased to
exist (if it ever existed).”); see also Humphries v. County of Los Angeles, 554 F.3d
1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2009) (reversed on other grounds) (stating that parents found
factually innocent of child abuse were “living every parent’s nightmare” because
California would not remove them from its child abuse database).
253. See infra notes 255–298 and accompanying text.
254. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Cybersurveillance Intrusions and an Evolving Katz
Privacy Test, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127 (2018); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data
and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327 (2016); see generally
Elizabeth Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89
WASH. L. REV. 35 (2014).
255. See generally United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). In Jones, the issue
was not one of big data; instead, the case involved police tracking a vehicle for 28
days based on the manual installation of a GPS device. Concurrences by Justices
Alito and Sotomayor referenced the need for the court to begin to grapple with how
big data technologies may alter reasonable expectations of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment.
256. See generally Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. ___ , *2018 WL 3073916
(2018). This case involved the warrantless collection of cell phone location data over
127 days, creating a small but recognizable subset of the kind of persistent
surveillance and data collection that big data analytics and predictive policing
technologies rely on.
257. Id.
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possible the tracking of not only Carpenter’s location but also
everyone else’s, not for a short period but for years and years.” 258
This decision provides some hope that courts will be hesitant to
accept overreaching reliance on algorithmically determined probable
cause or reasonable suspicion.
With the advent of predictive policing technologies, some
defendants have argued that use of the technology requires a warrant,
or is not appropriately encompassed by the existing warrant through
which evidence was obtained. 259 Unfortunately, although courts
sometimes find that when police use advanced technologies they need
warrants, motions to suppress often fail under the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule. 260 That said, aggressive defense
motion practice has forced some prosecutors who wish to keep the
use of specific technology secret, to drop certain cases. 261 Defendants
have also begun demanding access to the data collected by predictive
policing systems, arguing it may contain exonerating information. 262

258. Id. at 2219. The big data analytics discussed herein are built on larger
databases and use more powerful analytics than the records of cell phone location
data at issue in Carpenter. See id. (explaining that the records at issue reflected the
state of technology at the start of the decade and that current technology is even
more powerful and precise).
259. See, e.g., State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (evidence
suppressed because police use of cell site simulator did not fall within a pen register
trap and trace order); United States v. Werdene, 883 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2018)
(deciding that a warrant to search computers outside of the issuing magistrate’s
jurisdiction using a “Network Investigative Device” violated Fourth Amendment, but
evidence was nonetheless admitted under a good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule).
260. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution generally excludes
the use of evidence obtained under an invalid warrant. See United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 906–07 (1984). However, in Leon, the Supreme Court created the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule, holding that the suppression of evidence was
not appropriate where an officer relied in good faith on a properly issued warrant,
even if the warrant was later determined to be invalid. Id. at 922.
261. See Burlacu, supra note 67 (describing how federal prosecutors dismissed
charges in a child pornography case rather than disclosing details about the Network
Investigative Technique (NIT) used to overcome defendant’s use of an IP masking
system; see also Robert Patrick, Controversial Secret Phone Tracker Figured in
Dropped St. Louis Case, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 19, 2015),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/controversial-secret-phonetracker-figured-in-dropped-st-louis-case/article_fbb82630-aa7f-5200-b221a7f90252b2d0.html [https://perma.cc/S6DZ-GR9F].
262. Emily Lane, Mayor, Police Chief to Face Subpoenas from Convicted Gang
Member over Palantir Claim, TIMES-PICAYUNE, NOLA MEDIA (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://www.nola.com/crime/2018/04/palantir_new_orleans_mayor_lan.html
[https://perma.cc/E5WC-S628] (reporting that defense counsel in New Orleans, which
secretly used a predictive policing system, subpoenaed information about the
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Criminal justice automated risk assessment systems have been
implemented in pre-trial detention, probation, and sentencing
contexts for many years. Most of these systems were created for use
in probation determinations, but like many technologies, “mission
creep” has allowed them to be adapted and used in sentencing. 263 In
State v. Loomis, the defendant challenged the court’s use of an
algorithmic risk assessment score to support its sentencing
determination. 264 He argued this violated his due process rights on
two grounds: that the proprietary nature of the automated system,
called COMPAS, prevented him from challenging the system’s
scientific validity, and that the system unconstitutionally took gender
into account. 265
The Wisconsin Supreme Court ultimately upheld the trial court’s
use of the technology because it found the COMPAS score was only
one of many factors considered during sentencing. 266 However,
unlike an earlier challenge to automated sentencing technologies,267
the Wisconsin court engaged with the critiques of risk assessment
tools, including those alleging racial bias. 268 While permitting use of
COMPAS, the court required that all future Presentence
Investigation Reports contain a written caution about risk assessment

system’s data collection and analysis, arguing this information could exonerate
defendants).
263. Mission or data creep is the repurposing of data analytics beyond its original
purpose. This secondary use is extremely problematic because it relies on data not
collected or screened for the purpose it is ultimately used for. See Matthew T. Bodie
et al., The Law and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 96, 1000–01
(2017); see also Wendy K. Mariner, Mission Creep: Public Health Surveillance and
Medical Privacy, 87 B.U. L. REV. 347 (2007) (describing mission creep in public
health surveillance policies).
264. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 752–53 (Wisc. 2016).
265. Id. at 757. COMPAS is a privately-owned risk assessment system designed to
provide a numerical score indicating the likelihood that an individual will commit
another crime in the future.
266. Id. The court made clear that using COMPAS could not be sentence
determinative. Id. at 767.
267. Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564 (Ind. 2010). The defendant in Malenchik
made a number of arguments, including that the risk assessment tool was unreliable
and discriminatory. The court disagreed, citing the “growing body of impressive
research” supporting its use. Id. at 573.
268. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 762–63 (referencing Angwin et al., supra note 76, as
well as its follow-up story, Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS
PROPUBLICA
(May
23,
2016),
Recidivism
Algorithm,
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivismalgorithm [https://perma.cc/75X8-ZVBS]). The court also discussed a study done by
California’s Department of Corrections questioning COMPAS. See id.
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systems, including a warning to judges about the program’s lack of
transparency and the potential for bias. 269
The Loomis decision is instructive because the court engaged with
critiques of algorithmic technology and set limits for its use. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court was also clear that it purposefully did not
address an equal protection challenge to the system. 270 In addition,
one of the concurrences argued that sentencing judges reviewing risk
assessment scores should be required to place on the record their
evaluations of strengths, weaknesses, and relevance of the scores to
the individuals being sentenced. 271 Given that a concurrence, like a
dissent, has the capacity to “sow the seeds for future harvest,” 272 the
Wisconsin Court’s willingness to take seriously challenges to a wellknown, long-used risk assessment system is a step in the right
direction, even as the ultimate decision permitted the system’s use.
Challenges to governmental use of decision-making technology in
non-criminal cases are more common. These cases challenge
government actions that negatively affect a plaintiff’s constitutional273
269. Per the court’s ruling in Loomis, the following cautions must be provided to
sentencing judges: (1) the proprietary nature of COMPAS has been invoked to
prevent disclosure of information relating to how factors are weighed or how risk
scores are determined; (2) because COMPAS risk assessment scores are based on
group data, they are able to identify groups of high-risk offenders — not a particular
high-risk individual; (3) some studies of COMPAS risk assessment scores have raised
questions about whether they disproportionately classify minority offenders as having
a higher risk of recidivism; (4) a COMPAS risk assessment compares defendants to a
national sample, but no cross-validation study for a Wisconsin population has yet
been completed; risk assessment tools must be constantly monitored and re-normed
for accuracy due to changing populations and subpopulations; (5) COMPAS was not
developed for use at sentencing, rather it was intended for use by the Department of
Corrections in making determinations regarding treatment, supervision, and parole.
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 769–70 (numbering added for ease of reading).
270. Id. at 766 (noting that Loomis did not bring an equal protection challenge, and
specifically basing the decision on due process). Several scholars suggest that gender
differentials included in risk assessment tools violate equal protection; see Sonja B.
Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 823–30 (2014); John Lightbourne, Damned
Lies & Criminal Sentencing Using Evidence-Based Tools, 15 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
327 (2017).
271. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 774–75 (Abrahamson, J., concurring). Judge
Abrahamson also cited the “mixed reviews” that sentencing algorithms have received
in scholarly literature and popular commentary. Id.
272. William J. Brennan, In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 431 (1986).
273. Perdue v. Gargano, 964 N.E.2d 825, 832 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 2012) (entitlement
benefits like Medicaid, Food Stamps, TANF, properly characterized as “property”
interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause); Zynda v. Arwood, 175 F.
Supp. 3d 791, 807 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (questionnaire used to determine whether
unemployment claimants committed fraud violates the Fifth Amendment’s privilege
against self-incrimination).
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or statutory rights. 274 Most of the cases discussed herein involve two
kinds of instances: when the state uses algorithmic decision-making
systems to terminate the employment of public school teachers, and
when it relies on such technologies to reduce or discontinue a
recipient’s public benefits such as welfare, Medicaid, or
unemployment benefits.
Because these cases involve a property right, plaintiffs have been
most successful with procedural due process claims arising under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 275 These cases are often characterized as
“notice” claims, and the notice requirements prior to termination are
fairly substantial. Proper notice requires an opportunity to be heard
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, 276 and it must
adequately detail the reasons for termination or reduction of rights.277
In Houston Federation of Teachers v. Houston Independent School
District, the court found that the School District failed to provide
enough information about the algorithm used to terminate teachers,
even though it provided significant general, as well as some specific,
system details. 278 The court held that what was given was not
sufficient to satisfy procedural due process because the information
did not allow individual teachers to verify or replicate their scores. 279

274. Perdue, 964 N.E.2d at 829 (considering Americans with Disabilities and
Rehabilitation Act claims); K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d 703, 706 (D. Idaho
2016) (bringing claims under Medicaid Act); see generally State of New Mexico ex
rel. Stewart v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep’t, D-101-CV-2015-00409, at 24–27 (Santa Fe
County Ct. Dec. 2, 2015) (stating that claim hinges entirely on New Mexico state
law).
275. Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp.
3d 1168, 1175 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
276. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). Mathews also established a
balancing test to determine the level of protections a particular situation demands:
courts must consider the private interests that will be affected, the risk of erroneous
deprivation and probable value of additional safeguards, and the governmental
interest (including fiscal and administrative burdens) that additional or substitute
procedural requirements would entail. Id. at 335.
277. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267–68 (1970).
278. The district provided an overview of the general measurements — a general
description of the testing methodology, how to read the teacher assessment report, a
list of students whose scores were linked to the teacher and used in the scoring, and
the percentage of those students the individual teacher was responsible for. Hous.
Fed’n of Teachers, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1178. In a similar decision, the Indiana court in
Perdue found that generalized information connected to numerical codes used to
explain an adverse action failed to provide any information as to how the decision
was reached, and thus was constitutionally inadequate. Perdue, 964 N.E.2d at 835–
36.
279. Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1179.
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Procedural due process also requires clear ascertainable standards
to insure fairness and avoid arbitrary decision making. 280 In K.W. v.
Armstrong, plaintiffs sought detailed information of the State’s new
algorithmic process of determining eligibility for Medicaid. 281 The
state refused to provide the information in part because it was
copyrighted by a third party. 282 The court found that potential for
error in the system was “obvious” and “substantial.” 283 Then,
applying the balancing test dictated by the Supreme Court in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 284 the court held that the risk of erroneous
denial of benefits outweighed any potential harm to the third party,
and thus found a due process violation. 285
Substantive due process and equal protection challenges to
algorithmic technologies have fared less well. 286 Both of these
challenges only require the state to show that it has a rational basis
for its determination, unless the plaintiff is a member of a protected
class or can show that the state is infringing on a fundamental right. 287
The rational basis standard is very deferential to the state, and is
rarely met by the plaintiff. 288 However, in a case arising from the
“robo-fraud” system utilized by the Michigan Unemployment

280. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 715 (citing Carey v. Quern, 588 F.2d 230 (7th
Cir. 1978)).
281. Id. (requiring the state to draft clear standards of the terms used to terminate
or reduce benefits).
282. Id. at 717.
283. Id. at 716–17. The court walked through the steps required to implement the
“budgetary tool” and noted the multiple places for potential error, both procedurally
(transferring information from various pages of a questionnaire) and substantively
(misunderstanding a participant’s ability to accomplish a specific task). Id.
284. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
285. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 716–17 (finding substantial risk of
“mathematical, clerical, or substantive” error). The court also noted that any risk of
harm to the company could be substantially or entirely mitigated by a protective
order. Id.; see also Order, Jacobs v. Gillespie, 3:16-cv-119-DPM (E.D. Ark. Nov. 1,
2016) (ordering that state health benefits may not be reduced until the agency
provides specific notices explaining benefit reduction, referencing and including a
copy of the assessment algorithm).
286. Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2015) (deciding that a
substantive due process and equal protection challenge to a teacher assessment
system, which evaluated teachers based on the test scores of students they did not
teach or even in subjects they did not teach, passes rational basis).
287. Id. at 1300–01.
288. See Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F.
Supp. 3d 1168, 1180–83 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (describing several cases where plaintiffs
failed in challenging teacher assessment systems because the system passed rational
basis review).
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Agency, the equal protection claim survived a motion to dismiss. 289
There, the court found that because the system was not uniformly
applied and continued to operate after problems were identified, the
plaintiffs met their burden of showing intentional and arbitrary
disparate treatment of similarly situated people, which was “devoid of
any rational basis.” 290
Most of the cases challenging the use of automated decisionmaking tools also claim the systems suffer from statutory deficiencies,
alongside the previously discussed constitutional challenges. The
statutes are often relied upon because they contain notice and hearing
requirements similar to those protected by procedural due process. 291
Unlike procedural due process, however, statutes, especially those
written to implement specific types of assessment frameworks, may
include language requiring any state assessment system (including
algorithmic decision-making systems) to be transparent and
objective. 292 This is most evident in the recent trend of states
adopting Value Added Model (VAM) algorithms to determine
teacher competency. 293 At least two states that have implemented
teacher assessment systems included transparency and objectivity
requirements in their statutes. 294
289. Cahoo v. SAS Inst. Inc., 322 F. Supp. 3d 772, 800–02 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 2,
2018).
290. Id. at 801.
291. See, e.g., K.W. v. Armstrong, 789 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 2015) (describing the
notice and hearing requirements of the Medicaid Act and regulations).
292. See Lederman v. King, 47 N.Y.S.3d 838, 844 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016) (referencing
statutory requirement that the teacher assessment system must be transparent and
available to those being rated prior to the school year); State of New Mexico ex rel.
Stewart v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep’t, D-101-CV-2015-00409, at 24–27 (Santa Fe County
Ct. Dec. 2, 2015) (noting the statutory requirement that the teacher assessment
system must be objective and uniform statewide). In a case from Idaho, plaintiff
challenged the disability needs assessment algorithm by (in part) citing language from
42 U.S.C. § 1396n(j)(5)(D) of the Medicaid Act, which requires that a patient’s
medical assessment plan methodology use valid, reliable cost data, and be open to
public inspection. See Plaintiff’s Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint at
¶ 36, K.W. v. Armstrong, 1:12-cv-00022-BLW (E. Idaho July 24, 2014) (on file with
author).
293. Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 95, at 150–51. Algorithmic teacher
assessment systems are fairly recent, and are highly complex systems that assign a
score to teachers that allegedly represents the impact or “value added” an individual
teacher had on student learning. See Regina Umpstead et al., The New State of

Teacher Evaluation and Employment Laws: An Analysis of Legal Actions and
Trends, 322 ED. L. REP. 577, 584–87 (2015).
294. See generally N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3012-c(j)(1) (McKinney 2018) (governing
teacher assessment and requiring that the “process by which points are assigned in
subcomponents and the scoring ranges for the subcomponents must be transparent
and available to those being rated before the beginning of each school year”); N.M.
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In Lederman v. King, the court found that the teacher challenging
New York’s VAM assessment system was able to establish that the
implementation of the value added model was arbitrary and
capricious. 295 While the court focused on the biases and statistical
shortcomings of the system, 296 it also noted expert testimony
indicating that the system lacked the required transparency for the
petitioner to understand what she needed to do to achieve a
satisfactory assessment score as required by state law. 297 Similarly, a
New Mexico judge issued a preliminary injunction halting the
implementation of a teacher assessment system in New Mexico,
finding it was not transparent and was not applied uniformly across
school districts as required by state law. 298
In addition, while not a challenge to the technology itself, disabled
plaintiffs have successfully used federal disability rights laws to
oppose state requirements that impede their ability to interact with
automated benefits systems. 299 As states continue to reduce the
number of individual caseworkers, recipients are increasingly
expected to engage directly with the technologies evaluating them.
Thus, federal and state disability protections may become an
increasingly important route by which to challenge these automated
systems.
Beyond illuminating legal bases for challenging automated
decision-making systems, recent cases also highlight various practical
strategies. The first and most obvious is the need to educate oneself
and the judiciary as thoroughly as possible on all aspects of the
technology in question. For this, experts are required. Loomis is
indicative of the importance of educating judges. As the concurrence
pointed out, “this court’s lack of understanding of COMPAS was a

STAT. ANN § 22-10A-19 (West 2018) (requiring that the education department “adopt
criteria and minimum highly objective uniform statewide standards”).
295. Lederman v. King, 47 N.Y.S.3d 838, 847 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016).
296. The New York court found that the VAM algorithm was biased against
teachers with either high or low performing students, was disproportionately affected
by class size, and that the state could not account for the wide year to year swings in
teacher scoring. Lederman, 47 N.Y.S.3d at 846.
297. Id. at 845 (referencing testimony that New York’s system failed to provide the
information required by New York Education Law).
298. State of New Mexico ex rel. Stewart v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep’t, D-101-CV2015-00409, at 24–27 (Santa Fe County Ct. Dec. 2, 2015). New Mexico law requires
objective and uniform standards for teacher assessment. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-10A19 (West 2018).
299. See Perdue v. Gargano, 964 N.E.2d 825, 832, 843–44 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 2012)
(finding violations of Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act, where
the state provided only telephone interview to deaf plaintiff).

2019]

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

417

significant problem in the instant case. At oral argument, the court
repeatedly questioned both the State’s and defendant’s counsel about
how COMPAS works. Few answers were available.” 300
Algorithmic decision-making systems are inherently complex.
Many of the opinions discussed here rely heavily on the testimony of
plaintiff’s experts and their descriptions of the problems with the
technology. 301 Because the systems are often seen as infallible, and
because the state may refuse to admit system failures, experts are
crucial to finding and explaining system errors. In addition, disputes
between plaintiff’s and defendant’s experts can create a genuine issue
of material fact, which will allow the plaintiffs to overcome motions
for summary judgment. 302
Expertise is also essential to reveal data errors. Courts assume that
government databases are accurate and reliable, which increases the
likelihood that they will defer to the analytics that mine these
databases. 303 Systematic demonstration of data error is key to
convincing courts to review data analytics with a more critical eye.304
In the challenge to Idaho’s algorithmically controlled disability
determination, the court, after discussing the large number of data
errors the plaintiff was able to establish, held that “a substantial
number of known errors signals two things: (1) the existence of
substantial unknown errors; and (2) a lack of quality control.” 305

300. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 774 (Wisc. 2016). The concurrence objected
to the denial of the request by the developer of COMPAS to file an amicus brief,
which underscores the necessity for those challenging automated systems to have
their own experts and amici supporting their positions.
301. See, e.g., Lederman, 47 N.Y.S.3d at 896 (in finding that the state’s use of an
algorithm was arbitrary and capricious, the court explicitly referenced plaintiff’s
experts); Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp.
3d 1168, 1177 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (plaintiff’s expert was unable to replicate scoring);
Stewart, D-101-CV-2015-00409, at 24–28 (citing expert testimony about data errors,
missing data, and scoring abnormalities).
302. See K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d 703, 718 (D. Idaho 2016) (deciding
that a dispute between experts as to the unreliability of a budgeting algorithm makes
summary judgment inappropriate).
303. See Logan & Ferguson, supra note 135, at 543; Erin Murphy, Databases,
Doctrine, and Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 823–24
(noting that the presumption of regularity means that absent affirmative evidence to
the contrary, courts will assume the soundness of the information generated).
304. See Logan & Ferguson, supra note 135, at 608–09 (suggesting that courts
could adopt the position that unaccredited databases lose the presumption of
reliability).
305. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 711. The court also noted that sixty-six percent
of original training data had to be discarded because of data error and that the state
failed to audit the system after implementation even though it knew the extent of the
data error. Id.; see also Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1177 (providing a
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Advocates should also aggressively challenge claims that
information about the technology cannot be released because it is
proprietary, protected by a NDA, or is otherwise privileged. While
some courts have refused to require third parties to reveal proprietary
information, 306 several others have made it clear that such claims are
outweighed by a plaintiff’s due process rights. 307 As one court stated,
a private company’s “trade secrets do not empower, much less
compel,” a government agency “to violate the constitutional rights of
its employees.” 308 The court importantly went on to state: “When a
public agency adopts a policy of making high stakes employment
decisions based on secret algorithms incompatible with minimum due
process, the proper remedy is to overturn the policy, while leaving the
trade secrets intact.” 309
Advocates would also do well to leverage language indicating
judicial concern about algorithmic decision-making systems in
general. Given how new, complex, nontransparent, and potentially
harmful predictive algorithms are, courts have been willing to look
beyond their own jurisdiction for guidance. In the challenge to New
Mexico’s teacher assessment system, the State, seeking a dismissal,
cited a number of cases from other jurisdictions that had upheld
similar systems on equal protection and substantive due process
grounds. 310 The New Mexico court noted that the challenge at bar
was explicitly based on a state statute. 311 The court then used dicta
from several of the opinions the state had cited to find that while

myriad of reasons why algorithmic scores might be erroneously calculated, and notes
further that even when mistakes are found, that they will not be promptly corrected);
State of New Mexico ex rel. Stewart v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep’t, D-101-CV-201500409, at 24–27 (Santa Fe County Ct. Dec. 2, 2015) (listing errors in the data the
algorithm was analyzing).
306. See generally State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wisc. 2016). In Loomis the
defendant argued that he was denied the information the sentencing court relied on
because the developer of the algorithmic scoring system considered the information
proprietary and would not release it. Id. at 761. The court found that because the
defendant had access to the questions and defendant’s answers to the algorithm
evaluated, the defendant had enough of the information. The court did require that
going forward trial court judges must be told that the proprietary nature of COMPAS
prevents disclosure of how factors are weighed and risk scores determined for both
courts and defendants even as the questions and answers the system assesses are
released. Id. at 769–70.
307. See, e.g., Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 717–18. The court also noted that any
harm to the third party could be mitigated with protective orders. Id. at 718.
308. Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1179.
309. Id.
310. Stewart, D-101-CV-2015-00409, at 15–16.
311. Id. at 17.
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those systems may have passed the low bar of constitutional rational
basis review, courts viewed those systems as untested, unfair, and
problematic. 312 Even in Loomis, which upheld use of the assessment
tool in Wisconsin, the court provided cautionary language and
restrictions that can be used by advocates challenging other
algorithmic assessment systems. 313
However, confronting the many issues raised by governmental use
of predictive analytics likely exceeds the capacity of litigation based
on current legal doctrines and statutes. Addressing the potential
injustices of predictive algorithms can involve pursuing the hard work
of legal reform. 314 The language and spirit of well drafted statutes,
regulations, and ordinances can provide legal advocates and
grassroots activists with the tools to challenge these powerful but
fallible systems.
B. Regulation
Regulation, 315 through local ordinances or state statutes, can go far
in addressing the lack of transparency that results from government
secrecy or third-party claims of proprietary protections. Regulations
can also provide mechanisms to challenge database errors, and can
require much needed algorithmic testing and auditing. Law not only
guides government agencies, it provides a foothold for litigation to
keep those agencies in check. While marginalized populations will
always be targets of state authority, public policy, including rule-

312. Id. at 16–17 (“Needless to say, this Court would be hard-pressed to find
anyone who would find this evaluation system fair to non-FCAT teachers, let alone
be willing to submit to a similar evaluation system.” (internal citations omitted)).
313. See supra note 269 and accompanying text (describing the holding in State v.
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016)).
314. Frank Pasquale & Danielle Keats Citron, Promoting Innovation While
Preventing Discrimination: Policy Goals for the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV.
1413, 1413 (2014).
315. A comprehensive discussion of the myriad of regulations potentially
applicable to governmental algorithmic decision making is far beyond the scope of
this Article. For example, overarching national legislation similar to the European
Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) could address many of the
issues discussed in Part II. See generally Francoise Gilbert et al., Corporate

Governance in Insurance: The EU General Data Protection Regulation and Its
Implications for United States Companies, GREENBERGTRAURIG (Aug. 3, 2018),

https://www.gtlaw.com/en/insights/2018/12/published-articles/the-eu-general-dataprotection-regulation-and-its-implications-for-united-states-companies
[https://perma.cc/43J2-TPGW ] (providing a brief overview of the GDPR). However,
in the current political climate, national legislation regulating use of big data analytics
seems unlikely.
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making in its broadest sense, can shape and shift the balance of power
in civil society. 316
Technologies that remain secret are unchallengeable. To combat
this secrecy, communities are beginning to pass local ordinances that
require law enforcement to provide notice to local legislators and the
community before acquiring and deploying new surveillance
technologies. 317 These ordinances require such notice regardless of
whether the systems are purchased, provided by grants, or even gifted
to an agency free of charge. 318 Unfortunately, without careful
monitoring, governments may attempt to side-step regulations meant
to ensure transparency and public access. 319
Ordinances can also require agencies to provide annual reports
about the technologies being deployed or considered by law
enforcement. 320 Additionally, ordinances can provide more formal
mechanisms for public input. One ordinance, passed in Oakland,
California, went beyond requiring community notification — it
created standing oversight committees to address police surveillance
and technology, with some seats reserved for members of the
public. 321 Such laws are critical not only because they mandate notice
and input, but also because they provide structures that facilitate
community engagement. 322

316. See K. Sabeel Rahman, Policy Making as Power-Building, 27 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 315, 318 (2018).
317. See Crump, supra note 65, at 1605 (discussing local procurement ordinances in
Seattle, San Diego and Oakland); Joh, supra note 58, at 127 (observing that Santa
Clara County became the first county in the nation to require government approval
prior to engaging new surveillance tools).
318. See, e.g., Crump, supra note 65, at 1614 (noting that Seattle’s procurement
ordinance requires that any city department obtain City Council approval prior to
acquiring surveillance technology and again prior to deployment).
319. Seattle’s police department secretly purchased technology to create a
database of social media postings in contravention of Seattle’s surveillance ordinance.
See Ansel Herz, How the Seattle Police Secretly—and Illegally—Purchased a Tool
for Tracking Your Social Media Posts, STRANGER (Sept. 28, 2016)
https://www.thestranger.com/news/2016/09/28/24585899/how-the-seattle-policesecretlyand-illegallypurchased-a-tool-for-tracking-your-social-media-posts
[https://perma.cc/C3WH-XEFE].
320. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 188.
321. See Crump, supra note 65, at 1626.
322. These are similar to the structures provided by consent decrees. See Sunita
Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community Engagement”
Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 796 (2016)
(noting that structures created by consent decrees requiring public input have
increased transparency of and oversight over local law enforcement).
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Regulations aimed at increasing local law enforcement
transparency arose because police were purchasing and implementing
predictive systems in secret. 323 Laws mandating transparency in
public purchasing already bind state agencies that oversee public
benefits programs. 324 Thus, the problem with automated public
benefits systems is not that they are purchased in secret, it is that the
systems themselves are opaque, the data sets contain errors and bias,
and error rates are hidden from the public. 325 This lack of
transparency is often aggravated by contractual NDAs or claims that
the information is proprietary. 326
The intermingling of public, private, and law enforcement data into
large data sets makes assessing the data for accuracy and
completeness difficult. However, there are existing statutes and
regulatory structures that could provide a framework for individuals
to inspect and correct inaccurate data. 327 The federal Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA), 328 for example, provides consumers with the
right to inspect and challenge their credit records for data error.329
Similarly, the federal government has data control requirements,
including expungement of overturned convictions, for large unwieldy
databases like the combined DNA profile database. 330 There is also

323. Crump, supra note 65, at 1604–05 (describing case studies suggesting that
police departments often acquire surveillance technologies without participation by
elected officials or the community); see also supra notes 61–68 and accompanying
text (providing examples of how police departments have concealed predictive
policing systems).
324. See, e.g., Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 95, at 109–10 (indicating that most
states have public records laws mandating disclosure of contracts with third-party
vendors); Natalie Gomez-Velez, Proactive Procurement: Using New York City’s

Procurement Rules to Foster Positive Human Services Policies and Serve Public
Goals, 9 CUNY L. REV. 331, 350–51 (2006) (describing New York City’s

procurement rules, which require open, competitive bidding, as applying to contracts
for the provision of social services).
325. See supra Part I.
326. See supra notes 241–43 and accompanying text.
327. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 248, at 20–21 (arguing that the private use
of algorithmic scoring requires that once firms have gathered data on more than 2000
individuals, those individuals should have the same rights to inspect, correct, and
dispute inaccurate data as those provided by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act).
328. 15 U.S.C. § 1561 et seq.
329. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 248, at 16. This is not to say the FCRA system
works well; indeed, it has been described as a “kafkaesque no man’s land that, more
often than not, fails to resolve the problem.” Madden et al., supra note 29, at 87.
330. Logan & Ferguson, supra note 135, at 551, 600 (suggesting that while the
statutes require systematic data correction for all agencies that access CODIS, a
comprehensive DNA profile database accessible by all levels of law enforcement, the
FBI (which manages the database) has been lacking in its upkeep of data quality).
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the federal e-verify system, which is used to police who may or may
not legally work. 331 This system has been plagued with data errors
that raise real barriers to employment. 332 But e-verify does have an
online self-check system, which allows for some ability to challenge
data errors. 333 While none of these systems work exceedingly well,
each provides some process for addressing and potentially correcting
data error — they can serve as guides for legislation that will address
errors in other types of data sets.
Regulating agency contract requirements can also increase system
transparency by limiting third-party NDAs or claims that the
technology is proprietary. When jurisdictions demand fewer and
narrower NDAs, third-party vendors often comply. 334 In addition,
regulations that govern contracts for algorithmic decision-making
technologies can mandate that all the results from validation testing
conducted prior to implementation be made public, and, more
importantly, that post-implementation testing and auditing be made
public as well. 335 Support for these transparency and accuracy
requirements comes not only from case law, but also from statutes
governing the doctrinal areas these systems function within. 336
Attempts to regulate and limit government use of algorithmic
decision-making technologies will not be easy. Litigation and law
reform, while critical to minimizing the harm these tools can cause,
are not standalone solutions. Both rely on community activism and
long-term grassroots organizing to be effective.

331. See About E-Verify, https://www.e-verify.gov [https://perma.cc/ZE9Q-FKCP]
(describing E-verify as a web-based system that allows enrolled employers to confirm
the eligibility of their employees to work in the United States).
332. Hu, supra note 156, at 1778.
333. Id. at 1764–66.
334. Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 95, at 164–66 (discussing successful usage of
contract language to limit trade secret and NDA claims).
335. Id. These requirements will increase costs but will also minimize adoption of
error prone systems and the litigation that follows. The need for testing and the
implications of systemic system failure is not unnoticed by courts. See K.W. v.
Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d 703, 714 (D. Idaho 2016) (noting that given the failure
rates of the system, a premium should have been put on testing it in the first place);
Zynda v. Arwood, 175 F. Supp. 3d 791, 806 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (concluding that the
high error rate in an unemployment fraud detection system supports standing for
legal services office).
336. See supra note 292–94 and accompanying text (discussing statutes requiring
assessment systems be valid, transparent, and objective).
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C. Activism and Organizing
Social control algorithms are impoverished and impoverishing.
Challenging them requires an engaged community knowledgeable
about their fallibility and willing to establish coalitions to confront
them. Most importantly, it requires expanding the current focus on
law enforcement technologies to include all of the systems used to
control and punish people. Governmental deployment of data
analytics to manage marginalized populations is a political decision,
albeit one that reframes large political questions as “mundane issues
Confronting such
of efficiency and systems engineering.” 337
dangerous politics requires prolonged and aggressive advocacy.
Some see government use of algorithmic social control tools as a
fait accompli and focus on how to cabin and tweak the technology to
minimize its harm. 338 Others call for more aggressive tactics, folding
challenges to governmental use of algorithmic decision-making into a
larger fight for social justice. 339 As they are used today, predictive
technologies are destructive not only to individuals, but also to the
very concepts of equality and justice. Additionally, once these
technologies become acceptable as tools to manage any one
population, it will be much harder to challenge its use to control
others. As in any battle for civil rights and equity, a wide range of
approaches and tactics will be necessary. However, given the
complexity of predictive analytics, thorough community education is a
critical first step.
Education is central in large part because predictive algorithm
systems have flourished in secret, which has allowed their use to go
undetected and unchallenged for extended periods of time. The more
communities and advocates understand predictive algorithm systems
and how they are used, the easier it will be to identify when they are
deployed. The more people learn about the fallibilities inherent in
predictive analytics — the biases, feedback loops, erroneous data, and
unchecked, undemocratic power hidden within them — the easier it
will be to challenge unquestioning societal acceptance of predictive

337. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 197. Governmental use of the social control
technology can be seen as political because it reflects a choice of where to focus
public resources and because purchasing tools specifically designed to control
unpopular groups furthers a particularly neoliberal politic.
338. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 6, 187–88.
339. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 204–05.
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technologies. Community education is also necessary to maintain
what is bound to be an ongoing, long-term battle. 340
Education can also support calls to repurpose predictive systems.
Instead of being used to target and control, the technology could be
used to help and uplift vulnerable populations. Big data analytics can
be used to identify risks to a community, but instead of addressing
those risks through law enforcement, other social service systems
could be employed. 341 Similarly, predictive technology could be used
to ensure that the poor and families in distress receive all the benefits
to which they are entitled. 342 These systems can also be repurposed
to strengthen judicial oversight of warrant requests, 343 or to identify
police officers with poor decision-making skills so they can go
through additional training. 344 Thus, education is key to creating the
necessary narratives to challenge how, and for what purpose,
governments use predictive analytics.
This is not a new fight — there have already been many
successes, 345 and organizing and advocacy is ongoing. 346 However,

340. See Crump, supra note 65, at 1628–29 (noting that the success of Oakland’s
citizen task force requires high levels of community involvement, which is supported
by Oakland’s long tradition of activism — indeed, communities without that history
may have difficulty sustaining similar levels of input and engagement).
341. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 170–71 (discussing how
systems could augment a public health approach to social ills by decoupling risk
identification from a policing solution).
342. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 81–82.
343. Andrew Manual Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in
Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2074–76 (2016) (describing the capacity of
algorithms to help courts identify, track and assess the accuracy of the probable cause
scripts used to support warrant requests).
344. Studies show that applying predictive analytics to internal police data can
identify which officers are more likely to make bad decisions or have inappropriate
use of force complaints made against them. See THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING,
supra note 6, at 147–48.
345. See, e.g., EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 64–72 (arguing that grassroots organizing
is key to stopping attempts at privatizing benefits systems); see also Michele Gilman
& Rebecca Green, The Surveillance Gap: The Harms of Extreme Privacy and Data
Marginalization, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 253, 303–04 (2018) (describing
how Seattle’s homeless population successfully fought the city’s mandatory data
collection program).
346. One example of ongoing advocacy is the Stop LA Spying Coalition, which
provides community outreach and joins legal challenges to stop predictive policing
campaigns in Los Angeles and elsewhere. About Us, STOP LAPD SPYING COAL.,
https://stoplapdspying.org/about-slsc/
[https://perma.cc/DKT6-WV34].
Another
example is Our Data Bodies: Human Rights and Data Justice, which works with local
communities to show how different data systems impact reentry, fair housing, public
assistance, and community development. See Our Data Bodies: Human Rights and
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most of the current organizing is framed as a civil liberties issue,
focusing on surveillance and predictive policing technologies. 347 This
is worrisome, as it allows other governmental use of these systems to
escape scrutiny. It is critical for advocates to realize that predictive
technologies used by government share a commonality of
consequences, 348 that they target the same populations regardless of
which agencies are involved. State violence against marginalized
populations is not just police violence, it is the violence of being
policed and controlled by opaque and unchallengeable tools,
regardless of the context.
While organizing is never easy, especially across race and class,349
the technology itself is conducive to the creation of broad alliances.
The analytics and databases used in predictive policing are similar to
those used to target and control Medicaid recipients or families mired
in the child welfare system. The predictive analytics used to assess
eligibility for unemployment are similar to those used to asses teacher
competency. The problems with predictive technologies, including
failure rates, biased feedback loops, data errors, and lack of
transparency, are all the same. Organizing around the similarities of
the systems that governments use to control and manage people can
strengthen and speed coalition building.
Readers, especially those from a legal background, may avoid
consciously engaging with calls for social justice organizing. Many
within the legal system tend to rely on legal strategies and the drafting
of laws and regulations to address social concerns. However,
Eubanks’s description of how these systems create and maintain a
digital poorhouse should cause all of us to stop and realize that

Data Justice, ODB PROJECT, https://www.odbproject.org [https://perma.cc/EM9Q-

P8PU].
347. See, e.g., ACLU COMMUNITY CONTROL OVER POLICE SURVEILLANCE
(CCOPS) MODEL BILL, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/files/communitycontrol/ACLULocal-Surveillance-Technology-Model-City-Council-Bill-January-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GKN5-L7UK] (providing a model act to “Promote Transparency
and Protect Civil Rights and Civil Liberties with Respect to Surveillance
Technologies”). While the model act has a broad definition of “surveillance
technology,” which includes “software designed to integrate or analyze data from
Surveillance Technology,” it is unlikely it would encompass the types of algorithmic
decision-making systems used to assess and regulate public benefits or sentencing
algorithms. Id. § 12(E)(1)(q).
348. Hu, supra note 156, at 1740.
349. See EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 216. Pointing out the “deep classism” of many
progressive organizations that inhibits coalition building, which actually results in
progress for the poor.
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surveillance and data collection, which is now used to police the poor,
will be turned on others once it is perfected:
Think of the digital poorhouse as an invisible spider web woven of
fiber optic strands. Each strand functions as a microphone, a
camera, a fingerprint scanner, a GPS tracker, and alarm trip wire,
and a crystal ball. Some of the strands are sticky. They are
interconnected, creating a network that moves petabytes of data.
Our movements vibrate the web, disclosing our location and
direction. Each of those filaments can be switched on or off. They
reach back in history and forward into the future. They connect us
in a network of association to those we know and love. As you go
down the socioeconomic scale, the strands are woven more densely
and more of them are switched on. 350

Clearly, we are not individually in charge of the systems that create
this web and cannot easily switch the strands on or off. Because the
criminal justice and social welfare systems are fused, to successfully
challenge the use of advanced technologies in one arena requires
challenging them in all arenas. This means that advocates must
organize around issues of poverty and disability as well as surveillance
and predictive policing.
Dismantling any part of the digital
poorhouse means asking not just whether the technology will increase
surveillance by the state or displace probable cause — it means asking
why we have a digital poorhouse in the first place.
CONCLUSION
We live in a country where marginalized populations are seen as
problematic, a people to be contained and controlled rather than as
equal citizens. We also live with a justice system that has historically
been used to police race and poverty. These historic patterns are
being re-codified in a technological redlining that reinforces
oppressive social relationships and enacts new models of profiling and
policing. 351 Misguided government reliance on flawed algorithms as
social control mechanisms endangers vulnerable populations and
impoverishes our country.
As our legal system becomes ever more intertwined in big data
analytics, advocates must learn to recognize the harms caused by
these technologies and think creatively about how to oppose them.
Challenging governmental deployment of social control technologies
will require melding social activism with pragmatic legal and

350. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 188–89.
351. See NOBLE, supra note 7, at 1.
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legislative advocacy. Only then will we be able to untangle our
clients, ourselves, and ultimately our democracy from their grasp.

